Is there a
difference between a reasonable royalty and a FRAND royalty? Put another way,
should a reasonable royalty awarded for the infringement of an SEP owned by a
non-SSO member be different from a FRAND royalty awarded for the infringement
of the same SEP if it were owned by an SSO member that had made a FRAND
commitment?
At the outset, I’d
like to thank Professor Norman Siebrasse for his two previous posts, which have
set the stage for this question. My own views are largely in accord with
Professor Siebrasse’s, and therefore somewhat at odds with Professor Gregory
Sidak’s concerns, as expressed in his recent article,
that the ex ante valuation framework threatens to undercompensate owners of
standard essential patents (SEPs). Nevertheless, Professor Sidak’s point
about the interdependent value of SEPs is an important one that until now has
not received adequate attention in the literature.
First, a brief recap
of what I believe the correct approach to be, having read Sidak’s paper and
Siebrasse’s initial comments on it. Suppose
that an SSO is just about to decide which of two competing standards to adopt,
X or Y. X will incorporate patents A, B, C, D, and E; Y will incorporate
a different bundle of patents. The “ex ante incremental value” of A to
Implementer Z is the expected incremental contribution of A to Z’s use of
Standard X (which might not get adopted at all). The “ex ante contingent incremental
value” is the expected contribution of A to Z's use of standard X, on the
assumption that standard X is
adopted. Now let's assume the SSO does
indeed adopt standard X. The more realistic ex ante state of the world is
the one in which Z and the owner of patent A bargain to a license that is contingent
on standard X actually being adopted. If
so, then the theoretically correct FRAND royalty is the one based on ex ante
contingent incremental value. This
royalty allows the patentee to benefit from the fact that the patent has been
incorporated into the standard, which is a necessary contingency for any
royalty to be owing; but it is still an ex ante measure, not ex post Sidak
proposes. The problems with ex post valuations—that
they make the patentee better off than it would have been but for the infringement,
and exacerbate holdup and royalty stacking risks—remain and should be
avoided.
Sidak’s proposal
appears to rest on his characterization of the SSO as a joint venture, and his
concern that if the FRAND royalty is not based on ex post value there will be
an insufficient incentive for firms to join the venture. That would be true, however, only if the
patentee could expect to recover higher royalties if it was not a member of the
SSO and thus not subject to a FRAND commitment; but I don’t see why that should
be the case. In other words, I don’t see
any reason why a reasonable royalty awarded for the infringement of an SEP
owned by a non-SSO member should be
any higher than a FRAND royalty awarded for the infringement of an SEP owned by
an SSO member; both amounts should be calculated on the basis of ex ante
contingent incremental value and therefore should be the same. (That should apply both for royalties awarded
for past infringement and for ongoing royalties awarded in lieu of an
injunction, but that’s a subject for another post.) In both cases, the correct royalty is the ex
ante contingent incremental value: what
the parties would have agreed to ex ante, on the assumption that the patent would
be incorporated into standard X. On this
interpretation, the only thing a FRAND commitment adds to the mix is that it is
a commitment and therefore may give rise
to some sort of contractual or equitable duty to bargain toward and accept a
reasonable royalty. Additionally, being a member of an SSO may confer other
benefits, among them the ability to participate in setting the standard and a
commitment from other SSO members to license their patents on a FRAND basis
(the latter being of concern to operating companies, though not to NPEs). (Sidak mentions, at p.990, that an SEP
holder also must take into account “the fixed costs of participation in the
SSO,” which might include, for example, the possibility that “failure to
disclose a potentially essential patent may subject a firm to antitrust
scrutiny, and the costs of defending a potential suit.” Based on the outcome of the Rambus case in the U.S., this may be a fairly
remote risk, however. And non-SSO
members may get hit with low-probability-of-success antitrust suits for any
number of reasons too.) But the basic
point is that it should not be necessary to equate FRAND royalties with ex post
values in order to induce participation in the SSO.
Going back to the
initial hypothetical, another point to note is that the parties could agree ex
ante to a license (1) that is contingent on standard X being adopted, and (2)
the amount of which is contingent on how much Z actually uses the
invention. This second condition is the very definition of a running
royalty, as Siebrasse points out, where the rate and the definition of the base
are fixed but the value of the base depends on use. I suppose we could call
this the “ex ante double contingent incremental value,” though that’s a bit
wordy. In theory, it's a matter of no difference whether you use the ex
ante contingent incremental value or the ex ante double contingent incremental value.
(Although I had long forgotten it, it appears that Roger Blair and I, citing a
paper by Sherry and Teece, made something like this point in Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 Tex.
Intell. Prop. L.J. at 41-42 & n.203 (2001).) In reality, however,
parties often prefer to use running royalties because of the difficulty of
accurately predicting the amount of use ex ante. Moreover, as Blair and I
discussed in another paper (The Elusive
Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 Tulane L. Rev.
1323, 1397-1401 (2000)), there may be some consequences in terms of efficiency
of production as well.
A
final observation is that, as Sidak notes, it is often unrealistic in practice
to actually apply an ante framework--too many variables are unquantifiable in
reality--and that we need to resort to appropriate heuristics. Based on
my initial reading, I think that much of Sidak's analysis of what those
heuristics should be makes sense. I plan to reread this portion of his
article, however, and may address the matter a little more thoughtfully in my
next post.
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