As Many as Three Incompatible FRAND Judgments Before Breakfast

Within the past week, there have been three judgments rendered in the ongoing FRAND dispute between ZTE and Samsung.  (For discussion on this blog of earlier proceedings in this dispute, see here.)  On Friday, Mr. Justice Meade issued his decision in Samsung Elecs. Co. v. ZTE Corp., [2026] EWHC 999 (Pat.) (Eng.).  In this action for a declaratory judgment, brought by net licensee Samsung, the court determines that a court-determined global FRAND license pertaining to ZTE’s and Samsung’s portfolios would (1) cover both 4G and 5G technology, (2) run for five years, and (3) require a net payment from Samsung in the amount of $392 million.  This number is derived from one comparable, the 2020 SEP license between ZTE and Apple.  Because ZTE negotiated this license from a position of comparative weakness, in part due to U.S. sanctions levied against the firm, the court effectively increases the inferred amount by 21%, which results in a net amount of $392 million.  Meanwhile, it has been widely reported that on the very same day the Chongqing court, in which a parallel global FRAND rate determination has been ongoing, issued a decision applying a top-down methodology and awarding ZTE the full amount it had sought for a six-year license, namely $731 million.  Then today the ip fray blog reports that the Munich Regional Court issued a written decision (apparently not yet publicly available), following up its oral decision last week that ZTE was entitled to an injunction, in which the court states that in its view a five-year global FRAND royalty based upon a top-down methodology would be in the amount of $640 million.  The report indicates that the court urged the parties to settle.

Settlement would seem the most likely course to me at this juncture; but settlements occur in the shadow of the law, and so the question arises . . . well, what exactly is the law here?  In other words, if the parties don’t settle, what happens?

Without the text of the Chongqing decision, the answer to this question is necessarily somewhat speculative—and even with it, I’m not sure I know the answer, but I will hazard a few possibilities nonetheless.  First, since the English decision is (at this stage) only for a declaratory judgment, I think Samsung would have to follow up with a request for injunctive relief (within the U.K.) and/or specific performance, if it wanted to force ZTE to accede to Mr. Justice Meade’s terms.  But then the question would arise whether, if ZTE didn’t accede (or perhaps even if it did?), other jurisdictions would feel themselves bound to recognize the judgment.  I suspect the Chinese courts would not, particularly in view of the recently-published Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign States' Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Measures (which have been reported on elsewhere, and which may be the subject of a separate forthcoming blog post); and perhaps the German courts wouldn't either.  As for the Chongqing decision, if Samsung were to refuse to accede, I suspect that that court might enter an injunction against Samsung and/or permit the judgment to be levied against whatever assets Samsung has in China. Whether courts outside of China would enforce or recognize the judgment, however, remains to be seen; as readers are probably aware, the EU has a pending WTO complaint targeting China’s practice of establishing global FRAND royalties.  The German decision, if I understand correctly, would appear to force Samsung products off the market in Germany unless and until a license (covering at least whatever domestic SEP or SEPs are at issue in the Munich litigation) is concluded, but the court’s reported statements about the terms of a global FRAND license would not, in and of themselves, force Samsung to accede to those terms.  Whether other courts are persuaded by the Munich court's reasoning would be up to those courts.

These are all topics to which I will be giving a good deal of thought over the summer, as I work on an essay on IP and extraterritoriality.  I’m hoping as well that some of the well-regarded voices on private international law—that is, on general private international law not limited to the IP context, people such as Professors Bill Dodge and Curtis Bradley--will have something to say about this morass, and possibly how to resolve it.         

Kapischke on Interim Licenses and AILIs

Justus Kapischke has published an article titled Interim Licences and Anti-Interim-Licence Injunctions:  Semi-strict non-interference or rules for the race?, 5/2026 GRUR 275.  Here is the abstract:

This article analyses and provides background information on two recent decisions of the LG Munich I and the LD Mannheim.  In both decisions, the courts react negatively to the English practice of awarding interim licence declarations in FRAND disputes, enjoining implementers from applying for such relief.  The LD Mannheim further offers its opinion on the limits of final FRAND determinations in England.

The decisions at issue are, of course, Judgment of Nov. 26, 2025, LG Munich I, 21 O 12112/25, and InterDigital VC Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., UPC_CFI_936/2025 (LD Mannheim Dec. 22, 2025), both of which entered anti-interim license injunctions (AILIs) directed against Amazon.  (Both decisions are also excerpted in this same issue of GRUR, at pp. 313-30.  The appeal from the Mannheim LD decision will be heard on May 28.)  The author ably illustrates the incompatibility of the English approach to FRAND disputes (under which the court’s task, ultimately, is to set a rate) and the German/UPC approaches (which to date have focused on conduct), writing that “[a] foreign court making injunctions unavailable by ordering the SEP holder to grant a licence interferes with the incentive structure of injunction focused approaches,” whereas “conduct-based injunctions may force settlement before any court had the chance to establish FRAND terms either by determining them or by confirming the FRANDness of the SEP-holder’s offer, frustrating a rate-setting approach” (p.177).  He questions some of the analysis of the above two decisions, noting that they both seem premised on the coercive effect of an English declaration concerning interim licenses (effectively equating them to antisuit injunctions), even though “it is clear that interim licences do not force an SEP-holder to accept rate-setting proceedings in the implementer’s preferred forum” (p.179).  True, the SEP holder’s refusal to comply with the declaration could result in its being deemed an unwilling licensor, but the author states that the SEP holder’s seeking an AILI is “unlikely to change anything about that” (p.180).  (In addition, it would seem to me, the odds that the SEP holder would obtain an injunction in the U.K. are pretty negligible anyway, aren’t they?)  In addition, he notes both courts’ emphasis on the territorial nature of patents, which however in a strictly jurisdictional sense “appears not to be the current law in Germany or the EU as exemplified by the ECJ’s judgment in BSH” (p.182).  I’m glad to see someone making this connection, which seems quite important to me.  The author argues, however, that strict territoriality is not the Mannheim LD’s position, but rather only what he refers to as “semi-strict” territoriality in the sense that “courts can, on behalf of SEP holders, impose their view of global FRAND licences on implementers by way of injunctions,” but implementers “may not use similarly coercive measures as means of imposing global FRAND determinations on SEP holders, since this would interfere with foreign infringement proceedings” (p.182).  I’m not entirely sure of the author’s view here, but I’m not convinced of the merits of this distinction.  (I plan to explore the question more deeply in a forthcoming essay I will contributing to the Research Handbook on Extraterritoriality and Intellectual Property, which I mentioned here the other day.  Consistent with the author’s observation that “both sides can at least plausibly accuse each other of having taken the first ASI-like measure” (id.), it has long seemed to me that when courts start issuing ASIs, AASIs, AILIs, declarations concerning interim licenses, and so on, it is awfully difficult to say which jurisdiction is the one violating the comity norm.)  The author closes by suggesting that it would be helpful “to obtain authoritative constructions of the relevant (F)RAND undertakings from the French of Swiss courts,” and also if SEP holders “offer[ ] to refrain from seeking injunctive relief if the implementer agrees to be bound by a rate-setting procedure in Germany or at the UPC” (id.).  Might the German courts and/or UPC ever head in this direction?      

China and ASIs

I don’t think I have previously this mentioned on this blog, but Professor Tim Holbrook and I have signed a contract with Oxford University Press to coedit an edited volume titled Research Handbook on Extraterritoriality and Intellectual Property Law.  I will have more to say about this project over the course of the next year or so, but for now will just note that we have assembled a list of about forty contributors, including ourselves, to address the many issues that may arise in evaluating the geographic scope of IP rights.

One group of such issues, of course, relates to standard-essential patents; among the relevant issues are whether courts can or should award global royalties, with or without consent of the parties, and whether they can or should award interim relief such as antisuit injunctions, anti-antisuit injunctions, or declarations concerning interim licenses.  In connection with antisuit injunctions, as readers are by now aware, a WTO arbitration panel last year ruled in favor of the EU's appeal from the original panel decision, in finding that China’s antisuit injunction policy violated TRIPS articles 28.1 and 28.2, read in light of article 1.1 second sentence (see my post here).  It is therefore notable that, as has been reported elsewhere, on April 1 the EU published an announcement that China had announced its withdrawal of the antisuit injunction policy at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body meeting in September.  The minutes of that meeting are available here, and the EU-China dispute is Item 2 (pages 6-9).  China expresses its agreement with the original panel opinion and its disagreement with the arbitration panel, before stating in paragraph 2.4 that the Supreme People’s Court had issued a notice on September 25 “stating that the so-called ‘ASI policy’, to the extent it ever existed, had been withdrawn and had no continuing effect upon how Chinese courts evaluated requests for anti-suit injunctions in the context of SEP litigation.”  The aforementioned EU announcement states that “[a]fter some initial technical issues were resolved, this notice is currently accessible online from outside China too” (if any readers can point me to it, I would appreciate it), but that “[g]iven the unwritten nature of China’s anti-suit injunction policy, the European Commission will continue to closely monitor the situation to ensure China’s full compliance . . .  and take further action, if necessary.”

In light of these developments, it was interesting to read an article by Yao Jianjun (former vice president of the Xi’an Intermediate People’s Court) in an issue of China Patents & Trademarks, No. 4, 2025, that recently came my way.  The article, appearing in English translation at pages 12-22, is titled Application of Anti-Suit Injunctions in SEP Disputes.  It provides an overview of Huawei v. Conversant, which was the first of five cases from 2020 in which a Chinese court (here, the SPC) granted an ASI (here, against the enforcement of an injunction granted against Huawei in Düsseldorf).  The author discusses where ASIs fit within Chinese civil procedure law, as well as the five conditions specified by the SPC for granting an ASI (“the impact of the enforcement of foreign judgments on Chinese litigation,” “the necessity of ASIs as a preservation measure,” the “balance of interests of both parties,” “the impact of ASI on the public interest,” and “international comity”) and how they played out on the facts of Huawei v. Conversant.  The author agrees with the court’s decision, though he also notes some of the limitations of ASIs, and cautions against the sequence of lawsuits being a dispositive factor (insofar as this would encourage races to the courthouse).  Apparently the article was written before the EU-China matter was completed, since the author references its existence but not its conclusion.

One thing I found interesting in the article, and which I plan to discuss in the essay I will be contributing to the edited volume I mentioned at the beginning of this post, is the author’s emphasis on the perceived need to counteract the impact of proceedings initiated in another country which, he writes, may “impair[ ] the legitimate rights and interests of the applicant,” thus requiring “a remedy . . . to the party that has suffered damage to the injunction” (pp. 14-15).   In this regard, he writes, if Conversant had applied to enforce an injunction in Germany, the result would have been that Huawei either would have exited the German market or would have settled with Conversant (at a rate, he says, that would have been 18.3 times higher than the rate determined by the Chinese first instance court); and that "such potential damage . . . may substantially harm Huawei's legitimate rights and interests" (p.18).  This framing of the issues bears some resemblance the "effects" test (as used, for example, in U.S. antitrust litigation), under which courts sometimes justify the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction directed against extraterritorial conduct when such conduct has effects within the prescribing jurisdiction.  From an economic perspective, the application of the effects test is akin to the concept of internalizing an externality—though in this context, the twist is that the externality is caused by the foreign jurisdiction’s toleration or authorization of conduct which the domestic court would like to forbid.  Relevant to this point, a generation ago Professor Joel Trachtman wrote an intriguing paper titled Externalities and Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, in Economic Dimensions in International Law 642 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari et al. eds., 1997), in which he posits that, if we think of nations participating in a market for prescriptive jurisdiction, and of (in some cases) even having the ability to engage in some measure of Coasean bargaining, there is a range of possible options for allocating the right to prescribe.  Some allocations may be more efficient than others, under the circumstances at hand.  An unavoidable aspect of this framework, however, is determining exactly what counts or should count as a harmful externality—that is, one that causes cognizable harm, a topic that my colleague Claire Hill also has written about.  In the context of ASIs, of course, the country against which the ASI is directed (in effect though not in form, since the form of the injunction is inter partes) presumably believes that it is doing nothing wrong by entertaining a case that is lawfully before it, or by issuing an injunction against the infringement of domestic patent rights in accordance with domestic law; and indeed, if the WTO arbitration panel approach prevails, such conduct is in general privileged and does not cause cognizable harm under international law.  But one could also imagine an alternative rule under which the right to issue an ASI to prevent the perceived negative domestic effect (suffered by a domestic firm or by a domestic court) of a foreign injunction prevails over the foreign court's right to entertain a case or enter an injunction.  Determining which rule makes more sense from a policy standpoint might perhaps depend on how absolute the prohibition on ASIs is under the first approach, and how substantial the domestic effect must be under the second.  (Thinking of these issues from a slightly different angle, as I mention in a discussion of Professor Christopher Drahozal’s game theoretic approach to ASIs in my forthcoming book Wrongful Patent Assertion, in a given case reasonable minds may differ whether it is the country issuing the ASI, or the country against which the ASI is issued, that is deviating from the "comity" norm under which nations are largely left to determine their own domestic policies.)  At this stage, I'm not sure exactly where my analysis is going to lead, but this seems like an interesting problem for analysis through a law-and-econ lens; and if readers have any thoughts or suggestions, I’d be delighted to hear them.     

FRAND in Japan

As I note in my forthcoming book Wrongful Patent Assertion, in 2014 a Grand Panel of the IP High Court held, in Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Japan Godo Kaisha, Judgment of May 16, 2014, 2013 (Ne) 10043, that the owner of a FRAND-committed SEP may abuse its rights by seeking injunctive relief against a willing licensee; and “[i]n a subsequent decision, Imation Corp. Japan v. One-Blue LLC, Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb. 18, 2015, Case No. 2013 (Wa) 21383, the court held that the defendant (the manager/operator of a patent pool that included some SEPs) had engaged in unfair competition by sending a warning letter to three retailers threatening injunctive relief, because under the Samsung v. Apple decision, the act of seeking an injunction for the infringement of a FRAND-committed SEP against a willing licensee is an abuse of right.  The [latter] decision therefore appears to read Samsung v. Apple as holding that it is an abuse of right per se to seek injunctive relief against a willing licensee for the infringement of a FRAND-committed SEP.  Cf. Yuzuki Nagakoshi & Katsuya Tama, Japan Without FRANDS?  Recent Developments on Injunctions and FRAND-Encumbered Patents in Japan, 44 AIPLA Q.J. 243 (2016) (critiquing Samsung v. Apple for arguably creating such a per se rule and for ignoring, as part of the abuse of rights calculus, the rightsholder’s subjective intent; and proposing that Japanese courts hearing FRAND cases instead consider whether the rightsholder has satisfied its statutory duty to negotiate in good faith).”  Other than these two cases, however, to my knowledge there hasn’t been much any Japanese case law involving FRAND-committed SEPs, until last year when three new district court decisions—all involving the same plaintiff, Pantech Corp.—came out.  Two of these have recently made available in translation on the IP High Court’s website; the third, not yet.  They all appear to agree, however, that it is an abuse of right for the owner of a FRAND-committed SEP to seek injunctive relief against a willing licensee.

The first of the three, Pantech Corp. v. ASUS Japan Co., 2022 (Wa) 7976 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Apr. 10, 2025), involves Japanese Patent No. 4982653, titled “Method of transmitting and an apparatus for transmitting ACK/NACK information and a method of transmitting and receiving and an apparatus for receiving ACK/NACK signals.”  The court concludes that ASUS’ products infringe and that the claims in suit are valid.  On the issue of remedy, however, the court states that “a FRAND-encumbered standard essential patent holder's act to demand an injunction against a standard essential patent implementer based on the standard essential patent is impermissible as an abuse of right, unless there is a special circumstance where the standard essential patent implementer has no willingness to obtain a license under FRAND terms” (p.25).  After a review of the parties’ negotiating history (pp. 25-30), the court concludes that the defendant was a willing licensee, stating:

the reason for which the Plaintiff and the Defendant failed to reach an agreement on a FRAND rate in spite of prior consultations relating to the abovementioned findings and settlement talks in this lawsuit is that the FRAND rates presented by both parties were far too divergent, as explained in detail later (No. 7). According to both parties' assertions mentioned above and the entire import of oral arguments, the cause for this divergence is considered to be as follows: in major countries in the world, the Unwired Planet v. Huawei judgment, as presented by the Plaintiff, and other court precedents on FRAND rate calculation methods have developed internationally in response to changes of the times; on the other hand, in Japan, there have been no court precedents based on the abovementioned international development for about 10 years following the Apple v. Samsung Grand Panel judgment, and also, even taking into account various circumstances that appeared in this case, a FRAND rate calculation method has not necessarily been established in Japanese business practice (p.31).

Citing article 102(3) of the Japanese Patent Act (on reasonable royalties) and the IP High Court’s 2019 judgment in NeoChemir (see my blog post here), the court then sets out principles for calculating the FRAND rate:

In light of the global nature and the enormous number of standard essential patents implemented in the manufacturing of products conforming to a standard, when determining a FRAND rate, it is necessary [i] to take into consideration a royalty rate set in the actual license agreement for the standard essential patent, or if it is indefinite, a global average royalty rate in the industry; [ii] to presume the individual values of all standard essential patents to be the same because it is practically difficult to find the individual values of the enormous number of patents, and to calculate the value of a single standard essential patent by dividing the value of all standard essential patents by the total number of standard essential patents, while ensuring that the total amount of royalty obtained through aggregation of royalty rates of the standard essential patents remains  within a reasonable scope; and [iii] to also take into consideration, in such a case, possible contributions to sales and profits if all standard essential patents are used in the product. Furthermore, [iv] as a FRAND rate should fundamentally be agreed upon globally as soon as possible through good-faith negotiations between a FRAND-encumbered standard essential patent holder and a standard essential patent implementer, under the literally fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms, a reasonable FRAND rate should be determined by comprehensively taking into account the negotiation process between the parties and the standard essential patent implementer's willingness to obtain a license under FRAND terms, and other circumstances appearing in the lawsuit, from the viewpoint of facilitating the agreement (p.35).

Ultimately, the court calculates a royalty for the one patent in suit by multiplying the sales revenue from the defendant’s products (redacted) by the aggregate royalty burden for LTE-standard-related patents (which the court figures at 9% for LTE products, based on an analysis of findings made in Unwired Planet, TCL v. Ericsson, and Huawei v. Samsung, and 8% for 5G products (p.39)), and then dividing by the number of LTE-standard-related patents (which the court estimates to be 1,300, taken into account likely validity, etc., see pp. 40-41)).  The rate itself is redacted.

The second and third decisions are both actions by Pantech against Google Japan G.K.  I understand that both cases involve the same patent, Japan Patent No. 6401224 (“Method for mapping a physical hybrid automatic repeat request indicator channel”), but different accused products (the Google Pixel 7, since discontinued, and the Pixel 7a, respectively).  In the first of the two, 2023 (Wa) 70501 (Tokyo District Court June 23, 2025), a translation of which is available here, the Tokyo District Court agreed that a FRAND-committed SEP owner’s demand for an injunction “is impermissible as an abuse of right, unless there is a special circumstance where the standard essential patent implementer has no willingness to obtain a license under FRAND terms" (p.39).  The court nevertheless held that Pantech was entitled to an injunction because Google’s conduct during the course of a court-supervised settlement negotiation (occurring in July 2024) demonstrated that Google was an unwilling licensee.  In dicta, however, the court found no fault with Google’s pre-settlement negotiations behavior and thus would not have found Google unwilling on the basis of that conduct alone (see pp. 47-50).  In the second one, however—according to the commentary cited below, since a translation has not been uploaded yet—the Osaka District Court on July 10, 2025 concluded that Pantech was not entitled to an injunction, because Google had shown itself to be a willing licensee through the end date of negotiations the court took into account (November 30, 2023).  The commentaries below do not say anything about the Osaka court actually determining the FRAND royalty, and some more recent commentary indicates that by early January (with other cases involving newer models of Google phones pending) Pantech and Google had settled on global terms, following a recommendation by the Tokyo district court.

For commentary that was helpful in drafting this post, see Masachi Chucho, Pantech v. ASUS: A Recent FRAND Judgment from Japan (available here); Takeshi Komatani, Japan’s First SEP Injunction:  Pantech v. Google and the High Bar for Establishing Unwillingness (available on AIPPI’s website here); and Kenji Tosaki, Takahiro Hatori & Yujiro Fukuhara, The Japanese court first judgment to grant an injunction based on a FRAND-committed SEP (available on Chambers and Partners’ website here; original, longer version available here).   

Meanwhile, as discussed elsewhere (see, e.g., here, here, here, and here), in early 2026 the Tokyo District Court also issued two new documents, Guidelines for Patent Infringement Litigation Based on Standard Essential Patents and SEP Mediation Procedures.  I may have more to say about these in due time.   

Herr, Alymov & Nothmann on Whether the UPC Can Set Global FRAND Rates

Jochen Herr, Nikita Alymov, and Martin Nothmann have published an article titled Can the UPC set global FRAND rates?, 1/2026 GRUR Patent 18-24.  Here is the abstract:

The Unified Patent Court (UPC) is emerging as a key forum for SEP and FRAND disputes, yet its authority to set FRAND rates remains only partly defined.  This article examines whether, and under what conditions, the IPC may determine global FRAND rates focusing on procedural hurdles such as the party disposition principle, judicial discretion, territorial scope and the Huawei/ZTE compliance.  Furthermore, a recent order by the Local Division Paris confirms jurisdiction for counterclaims but leaves critical questions unresolved including whether stand-alone FRAND rate-setting actions are admissible beyond counterclaims in infringement actions.  This article will shed light on how the UPC’s evolving role could reshape licensing practices and forum selection.

The authors begin with a brief survey of FRAND determinations (or non-determinations) in Germany, the U.K., the U.S., and China, before taking on the principal topic of whether the UPC has competence to engage in FRAND rate-setting.  As noted in the abstract, in October 2025 the Paris Local Division in Sun Patent Trust v. Vivo concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider Sun Patent Trust’s request that the court, as an incident to Sun’s infringement claim, whether its offer was FRAND or if not.  (That order is now before the UPC Court of Appeal.  As the authors note in the body of the article, the request is not technically a counterclaim, notwithstanding the description of it as one in the above abstract; and it is fairly limited in what it says, to wit "The claimant has merely anticipated the so-called 'FRAND defence' that the defendant is raising against this type of infringement action. This FRAND defence falls within the jurisdiction of the UPC, according to a consistent UPC CFI caselaw which indicates that the FRAND issue can be dealt with incidentally by the UPC . . . . [A] discussion of FRAND terms, at least as a defence raised by VIVO at the time of the statement of defence, will undoubtedly follow, as anticipated by both parties. In the present case, all facts and arguments relevant to the determination of FRAND terms, whether admissible or not, will have to be debated by the defendants.")  The article then discusses the UPC’s decisions in Panasonic/OPPO and Huawei/Netgear, both of which concluded that they were competent to consider a FRAND rate-setting counterclaim, but did not actually do so after finding the implementers to be unwilling licensees.  The authors also discuss the possibility of stand-alone FRAND rate-setting actions in the UPC, but describe it as “problematic” in view of the various legal and practical obstacles that would have to be overcome.  

EU Requests WTO Panel to Determine Legality of Global FRAND Determinations in China

February was an unusually busy month for me, and my week-long bout with COVID didn't help, so I am behind schedule in blogging about recent events of relevance to the world of patent remedies.  One of the biggest of these was the European Union’s announcement on February 12 that it would be requesting the establishment of a WTO panel to determine whether China’s practice of establishing global FRAND royalties without consent of both parties violates the TRIPS Agreement.  The request for establishment of a panel in DS632 China-Worldwide Licensing Terms for Standard-Essential Patents is available here, and the EU's brief summary of the case here.  The WTO site for the case is here.

As previously noted on this blog, in January 2025 the EU instituted consultations with China concerning the issue of global FRAND royalties.  In addition, in July 2025 the EU prevailed in its other WTO dispute with China (DS611-Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights), concerning China’s antisuit injunction policy, when an arbitration panel (assembled in the absence, for several years now, of a functioning WTO appellate body) concluded (contrary to the initial panel decision) that that policy violated TRIPS articles 28.1 and 28.2 as read in light of article 1.1, because it “frustrate[d] the exercise of the exclusive right of a patent owner to prevent the use of the subject of its patent without its consent” and “alter[ed] the negotiating position of SEP holders in a fundamental way.”  Much the same logic is expressed in the EU’s current request, along with additional reliance on Paris Convention 4bis (which is incorporated by reference into the TRIPS Agreement).  In particular, the EU argues that the challenged measure (of setting global FRAND rates without consent of both parties) violates the following:

Article 28.1, read in conjunction with Article 1.1, first sentence, of the TRIPS Agreement, because China's measure has as its effect to restrict the ability of the owner of a non-Chinese patent to exercise the exclusive rights conferred on it by other WTO Members under Article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, i.e., to prevent third parties not having the patent owner’s consent from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented product.

 

Article 28.2, read in conjunction with Article 1.1, first sentence, of the TRIPS Agreement, because China's measure has as its effect to restrict the ability of the owner of a non-Chinese patent to meaningfully exercise its right to conclude licensing contracts, as conferred in the territory of other WTO Members under Article 28.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, by freely negotiating and concluding licensing contracts for the non-Chinese patents.

 

Article 4bis of the Paris Convention (1967), as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by virtue of Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, because China’s measure undermines the principle of territoriality and restricts the possibility for the parties subject to a decision rendered in China to start or continue proceedings before the courts of the WTO Member that granted the non-Chinese patents, and thus for the courts of that WTO Member to adjudicate actions relating to those patents in their respective jurisdictions.

Two obvious points to note.  One is that, although the EU is challenging China’s policy only, it would seem that if the EU’s position turns out to be sound, the U.K.’s policy of establishing global FRAND rates without consent of both parties would be equally vulnerable.  Second, if the EU’s position on Paris Convention 4bis is sound—and there is language in DS611 that is consistent with that position, as I noted here—wouldn’t that place the CJEU’s decision in BSH v. Electrolux in jeopardy as well, to the extent that decision appears to contemplate that courts in EU member states may adjudicate patent infirngement claims arising under non-EU member state law (as discussed, e.g., here and here?)   

Aggregate Royalties for Cellular SEPs

Nadia Soboleva and John Hayes have published an article titled Aggregate Royalty for Cellular SEPs in Recent Court Decisions, 11/2025 GRUR Patent 546.  Here is the abstract:

 

Standards organizations developing cellular communication standards typically require participants to disclose standard essential patents (SEPs) and agree to license such patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. When courts are asked to adjudicate license disputes involving SEPs, they often calculate the implied aggregate royalty for all SEPs in the relevant standard associated with a potential license.  We review five recently litigated FRAND cases and report the aggregate royalty per mobile device in most of these decisions falls in a range from $3 to $16, with an average of $9.25.  The aggregate royalty by the UK Court of Appeal in Optis/Apple is an outlier of $39.47.

The five cases are the U.S. TCL v. Ericsson decision, Unwired Planet, InterDigital v. Lenovo, Optis v. Apple, and the Chinese Oppo v. Nokia decision.  The authors write that these cases “encompass the only publicly available decisions that set a worldwide FRAND royalty for the 4G or 5G cellular standards.”

A few quick things to note.  First, the authors are both from Charles River Associates, and they note that they “have worked on multiple projects involving SEPs, including some of the matters discussed in” their article.  Second, I haven’t endeavored to check the authors’ analysis against the decisions they discuss.  I have no reason too question their analysis, but for now I am just reporting what they state.  Third, a range of $3 to $16 seems pretty broad to me, even without Optis/Apple (the appeal from which is pending before the U.K. Supreme Court).  Fourth, as noted previously on ip fray, the Munich Regional Court recently suggested in its decision involving Wilus and Asus that a rate of 10-18% for all SEPs reasonably necessary for operation of a mobile device would be within the FRAND range (see decision here, para. 294:  “Ausgehend von diesem Wert für den wichtigsten Standard (Mobilfunk) liegt die Gesamtbelastung für ein Mobiltelefon für alle für einen sinnvollen Betrieb erforderlichen Standards (Mobilfunk, Wi-Fi, Streaming, etc.) bei ca. 10% bis 18%.”).  For a mid-priced phone, that would be substantially higher than the aggregate royalty the above authors report, assuming that they and the Munich court are talking about the aggregate royalty burden for the same combinations of technologies.  Fifth, even if these are the only decisions available for the purpose of the study, five cases are a small sample, and whether the derived amounts accurately reflect FRAND rates depends on whether the courts in these cases got their numbers right; and some commentators have critiqued the methodology employed in, e.g., Unwired Planet.   Even so, one might be inclined to think that the Munich court’s range seems rather high, all things considered.

German Federal Supreme Court Rejects HMD’s Appeal

In 2024, the European Commission filed an amicus brief in a SEP case, VoiceAge v. HMD, urging the Munich Higher Regional Court to require strict compliance with the sequence of steps laid out in Huawei v. ZTE.  That court rejected the EC’s interpretation, as did the Higher Regional Court a few months later.  (For previous discussion on this blog, see here, here, and here.)  Today, the competition law senate of the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) rejected HMD’s appeal.  The press release (in German) is here; I would guess there will be a written decision to follow, at some point.  According to the press release, the Court concludes that, in accordance with the CJEU’s decision in Huawei v. ZTE and the BGH’s two previous decisions in FRAND-Einwand  I  and II, SEP owners are not hindered from enforcing their patents against unwilling licensees; and that the evidence in this case, which includes negotiations dating back to 2019, shows the implementer (HMD) to be an unwilling licensee.  Moreover—and consistent with the FRAND-Einwand  I  and II decisions (which, inter alia, require that implementers demonstrate their willingness to license throughout the entire course of negotiations in order to avoid injunctive relief)—the Court has no doubt that TFEU article 102 does not require strict compliance with the sequence of steps set forth in Huawei v. ZTE, and therefore concludes that it is not obligated to refer matter to the CJEU.  The court further sees no reason to address the appellate court’s requirement that, as part of the Huawei v. ZTE framework, the implementer must post security in the amount of the SEP owner’s offer, because in this case, it states, the security the defendant posted wasn’t even as high as its own counteroffer. 

Gervais on Territoriality and Global FRAND Rate-Setting

Daniel Gervais, one of the world’s leading experts on the TRIPS Agreement, has published a very interesting article titled The Principle of Territoriality in International Intellectual Property Law and Its Implications for Global FRAND Rate-Setting, GRUR Int. (advance access pdf available here).  Here is the abstract:

The principle of territoriality under which intellectual property (IP) rights exist and are enforced only within national borders sits uneasily alongside the global nature of standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing disputes. In recent years, courts in Brazil, China, Colombia, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and now the Unified Patent Court have asserted authority, directly or indirectly, to determine worldwide fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms, often without both parties’ consent. These practices, ranging from injunction-driven leverage to comprehensive judicial rate-setting, raise difficult questions about jurisdiction, comity, competition norms, and the coherence of international IP law.

 

This article provides a systematic and comparative analysis of the principle of territoriality in international IP law and its tension with non-consensual global FRAND determinations. It traces the origins and enduring role of territoriality in treaties such as the Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement, examines its implications for jurisdiction and choice of law, and explains why territoriality remains a cornerstone of global IP governance. It then turns to the distinctive case of SEPs, highlighting the role of standard-setting organizations and the unique licensing challenges they generate. Against this backdrop, the article maps national approaches across key jurisdictions, identifying functional categories (adjudicators, regulators, and leverage providers) and analyzing how their practices interact in transnational disputes.

 

Drawing on recent case law, WTO findings, and comparative treatment of other IP rights, the article argues that non-consensual global FRAND rate-setting undermines the territorial foundation of international IP law and risks destabilizing global markets. At the same time, it acknowledges arguments for efficiency and uniformity, and considers how these objectives might be pursued within a framework that respects sovereignty and due process. The article concludes by proposing both short-term and longer-term solutions, ranging from national court strategies and WTO enforcement to a possible role for WIPO, the US Congress, and the EU, designed to reconcile innovation incentives, market access, and the legitimacy of international dispute resolution.

I may have more comments to follow, but two things leap out to me upon first reading.  One is Professor Gervais’ argument that even the granting of purely domestic injunctions in FRAND cases, as in Germany, effectively albeit indirectly erodes the territoriality principle by “plac[ing] enormous pressure on the implementer to capitulate to the SEP holder’s terms” (p.13).  It might seem to follow from his analysis, then, that to uphold the territoriality principle nations would have to temper their enthusiasm for granting injunctions in at least some cases.  This may be right, though it also may seem a bit paradoxical that upholding the territorial principle under international law, as Professor Gervais understands it, would require nations to temper the use of a remedy (injunctions with domestic effect only, as a legal if not practical matter) that domestic law otherwise would permit in a given case.  (Again, that may be right—the principle seems logically appealing—but I wonder what the limiting principle would be?)  The other thing that caught my attention was Professor Gervais’ embrace of the view that, absent consent by both parties, only domestic courts can adjudicate questions of infringement and validity under domestic patent law.  This is, as previously noted here, the issue at the heart of the pending BMW v. Onesta dispute, in view of the CJEU’s 2025 decision in BSH v. Electrolux (which seems to me to point, whether rightly or not, in the opposite direction).   (Note that the Federal Circuit has temporarily stayed Judge Albright's antisuit injunction from last week, and we are still awaiting Judge Albright's written decision in that case.)

EWHC: Acer, ASUS, and Hisense Are Entitled to Declarations of Interim Licenses

Mr. Justice Mellor's decision in Acer, Inc. et al. v. Nokia Technologies Oy is here.

 

I have grading to complete, after which I will be taking a few days off around Christmas.  Consequently, I hope to have something to say about this complex SEP decision--and about the UPC Court of Appeal's recent decision on damages in Bhagat Textile Engineers v. Oerlikon Textile GmbH & Co KG, and the Federal Circuit's decision yesterday on injunctive relief and willfulness in Wonderland Switzerland  AG v. Evenflo Co.--sometime after January 1.  This has proven to be a busy month!  Anyway, happy holidays to my readers--see you in 2026.

EWCA Vacates Declaration of Interim License in Samsung v. ZTE

I was taking a blogging break ever since this decision was handed down on October 31, so I hadn’t written anything about it yet.   By way of background, this summer the EWHC (Mellor, J.) granted the interim declaration (which Samsung had sought), including among others the following terms:

1. ZTE are in breach of their obligations of good faith under clause 6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy.

2. A willing licensor in the position of ZTE, and in light of the undertaking given by Samsung, would enter into the interim cross-licence with Samsung on terms and including the sum to be paid by Samsung by way of royalty in respect of the interim licence period as set out in Confidential Annex 1 to this Order (the Interim Licence).

  
3. The terms (including the sum to be paid) of the Interim Licence are subject to adjustment and amendment so as to bring the terms into line with the terms of the final cross-licence determined to be FRAND by the Patents Court after the FRAND Trial in these proceedings (subject to any later adjustments or amendments following any appeals).

4. In the event that, within seven days of the date of this Order, ZTE refuse either 4.1 or 4.2 below, ZTE are in breach of their FRAND commitments under the ETSI IPR Policy and are unwilling licensors (and unwilling licensees).

4.1 To offer Samsung the Interim Licence and to enter into the same with Samsung; or

4.2 Give the following undertaking to the Court on condition that Samsung give the reciprocal undertaking set out above:

 

Pending any application for permission to appeal or the determination of any such appeal, ZTE undertake that they shall abide by the terms of the Interim Licence as if the same were in full force and effect and shall enter into the Interim Licence within seven days of any such appeal or permission to appeal being refused or withdrawn. If any appeal is finally allowed, ZTE shall repay any sums paid by Samsung under their undertaking given above which the Court decides should  be repaid (including interest if appropriate). 

On Halloween, however, the EWCA concluded that ZTE is not in breach of its obligation of good faith and is not an unwilling licensor/licensee.  (Meanwhile, the English courts’ willingness to grant declarations of interim FRAND licenses in some other cases remains controversial, as witness the back-and-forth between the EWHC and the UPC Mannheim Local Division in recent weeks in cases involving Amazon and InterDigital (see, e.g., here), and also the recent judgment in Warner Brothers Discovery Inc. v. Nokia Corp., [2025] EWHC 2888 (Pat.).  These cases remain works-in-progress, and I’m sure I will have something more to say about them all in due time.)

Anyway, on appeal in Samsung v. ZTE, Lord Justice Arnold writes the principal opinion, stating at the outset that this case differs from other EWCA decisions concerning interim licenses—Panasonic Holdings Corp. v. Xiaomi Tech. UK Ltd. [2024] EWCA Civ 1143, Alcatel Lucent SAS v. Amazon Digital UK Ltd. [2025] EWCA Civ 43, and Lenovo Group Ltd. v Telefonaktiebolaget Ericsson (Publ) [2025]—

 

in that the parties agree that there should be an interim cross-licence, and even agree as to the terms of the interim cross-licence, and in particular how much should be paid for it (the amount is confidential). They disagree as to whether the terms of the interim cross-licence, and in particular the amount payable, should be subject to adjustment so as to bring them into line with the terms of the final cross-licence determined to be FRAND by the Patents Court, as the Claimants (“Samsung”) contend, or so as to bring them into line with the terms of the final cross-licence determined to be FRAND by the Intermediate People’s Court of Chongqing Municipality (“the Chongqing Court”), as the Defendants (“ZTE”) contend. The appeal raises an important issue of principle: does it constitute bad faith for a SEP owner to commence infringement proceedings in multiple courts with the objective of forcing an implementer to accept determination of FRAND terms by the SEP owner’s preferred court rather than the implementer’s preferred court? Mellor J answered that question in the affirmative for the reasons given in his judgment dated 25 June 2025 [2025] EWHC 1432 (Pat) (para. 1).

The court states further that the relevant issues in such cases are whether the SEP owner is “in breach of its obligation to negotiate FRAND terms with the implementer in good faith,” whether the grant of the declaration would “serve a useful purpose,” whether it would be “contrary to comity with foreign courts,” and “[w]hat terms for an interim licence would be FRAND?” (para. 8).  Further, “the burden of proof lies on the implementer and the court must have a high degree of assurance before granting a declaration” (para. 9).

The relevant facts here, in brief, are that both parties have portfolios of certain FRAND-committed SEPs, but that when all is said and done Samsung will be a net licensee.  Samsung nevertheless was the first to file suit for a global cross-license, in the U.K., in December 2024, after which it filed an antitrust action in Frankfurt, and ZTE filed suit against Samsung in Chongqing seeking a global FRAND cross-license.  ZTE subsequently initiated proceedings in Munich, the UPC, Brazil, and Hangzhou, and Samsung countered with infringement actions in Germany, the UPC, and Hangzhou.  In July, “Samsung complained to ETSI that ZTE was in breach of the ETSI IPR Policy. On 14 October 2025 ZTE obtained an ex parte preliminary injunction from the Munich I Regional Court requiring Samsung to withdraw the complaint.  On 16 October 2025 Samsung withdrew the complaint in compliance with the injunction” (para. 37).  The parties have each offered to arbitrate but “neither had accepted the other’s offer” (para. 39).  Lord Justice Arnold then summarizes Mr. Justice Mellor’s judgment below, and proceeds to discuss ZTE’s first two grounds for appeal, namely that the lower court “was wrong to hold that ZTE had acted in bad faith” and “to treat the fact that the English courts were first seised as a decisive factor” (para. 54).  In effect, Lord Justice Arnold agrees with ZTE:

 

. . . In my judgment, unless there is a legitimate and substantiated objection to the forum in question, it does not constitute bad faith for a SEP owner to seek to force an implementer to accept determination of FRAND terms by the SEP holder’s preferred court rather than the implementer’s preferred court.

 

If (and I emphasise if) there is a legitimate and substantiated objection to determination of FRAND terms by the forum in question, then there may (and I emphasise may) in an appropriate case be a remedy by way of an anti-suit injunction. In the present case, however, both parties have laudably refrained from seeking anti-suit injunctions . . . .

 

Whether or not anti-suit relief would be available if there were a legitimate and substantiated objection to determination of FRAND terms by the Chongqing Court, Samsung have not substantiated any legitimate objection to this. . . .

 

If it is not illegitimate for the Chongqing Court to determine FRAND terms, I do not see how it can be bad faith for ZTE to use legal proceedings which it is not suggested are not otherwise properly open to ZTE to put pressure on Samsung to agree to that course. Such conduct is unattractive, and I should not be taken to endorse it, but that is not sufficient to constitute bad faith.

 

As I have explained in numerous judgments, a SEP portfolio will typically include patents which subsist in multiple jurisdictions. Patents are territorial, but the contractual defence provided by the FRAND obligation is global. It follows that the possibilities both of parallel SEP infringement proceedings and parallel FRAND determinations in multiple jurisdictions are inherent in the current system.  The principled answer to this might be that the court first seised should determine what terms are FRAND, but that answer has a number of negative consequences. One of these is that it encourages forum shopping by pre-emptive commencement of proceedings. As the judge recognised, forum shopping is to some extent inevitable in this context, but it should be discouraged rather than encouraged. Even if the English courts consider that jurisdiction should be exercised by the court first seised, this cannot be said to be an answer that commands universal assent: as I pointed out in Nokia v OPPO, there are no internationally agreed jurisdictional rules applicable to FRAND disputes. If the principle of ceding jurisdiction to the court first seised was internationally accepted, the Chongqing Court would have declined jurisdiction as the court second seised. The fact that the English courts were first seised is therefore not a sufficient basis for a conclusion that ZTE have acted in bad faith. Given that ZTE were otherwise entitled to bring the infringement proceedings of which Samsung complain, there is nothing else to support the conclusion that ZTE have acted in bad faith.

 

I would add that another problem which this case illustrates is that, if jurisdiction is not ceded to the court first seised, the court first seised is not guaranteed to be the first to decide. As the parties agreed during the course of argument, the consequences of this will have to be worked out in due course (paras. 70-75).

Although Lord Justice Arnold does not reach ZTE’s other two grounds for appeal, he does close by stating that “comity is a real concern in this case” (para. 78).

In a brief concurring opinion (with which Lord Justice Arnold expresses agreement), Lord Justice Birss makes some interesting points:

 

. . . this case is quite different from the previous cases concerned with interim licences in a FRAND context. In this dispute there are two competent courts both seised with the issue of making a global FRAND determination as between these two parties. The judge rejected Samsung’s criticisms of the Chongqing Court and there is no appeal from that conclusion. The judge also found (and again there is no appeal) that the behaviour of ZTE which was said to be in bad faith was not directed to extracting supra-FRAND rates. . . .

 

Rather, as the judge held, what ZTE were doing was directed at trying to force Samsung to agree to a FRAND determination in Chongqing rather than London. To “force” ZTE to reconsider was the reason for making the interim licence declarations below. A striking aspect of ZTE’s case on this appeal was that a flaw with the scheme of the declarations and interim licence made by the judge was, conversely, that it was not just designed to force ZTE to reconsider Chongqing, it has the effect of forcing ZTE to agree to a FRAND determination in London instead. Despite counsel for Samsung’s best efforts to submit to the contrary, in my judgment there is a significant degree of symmetry between the positions of the two parties in this case (para. 82-83).

Lord Justice Birss also contends that “[t]he concept of an interim licence is inherent in” Huawei v. ZTE, in which 

the CJEU identified the idea that in some circumstances it might be for the implementer, in advance of a final resolution of the dispute between the SEP holder and the implementer, to provide appropriate security for the royalties which will end up being due in a licence agreement. . . .  Once that principle is identified, one is entitled to ask: what is it that the implementer is getting in return for the financial commitment they are making? Although not spelled out explicitly by the CJEU, the answer is fairly simple. The implementer is demonstrating their willingness to pay for the licence, once the terms can be agreed or resolved, and so, in the meantime the SEP holder ought not to be able to take the implementer’s products off the market by means of an injunction. In other words what the implementer gets in return for the financial commitment is, at least implicitly, a form of licence pending the final resolution of the dispute. It could be called an interim licence. Assuming the sum being committed or paid is calculated on a global basis, then the willingness of the implementer which it embodies is also global in nature. . . .

 

The difficulty in this case is that the terms of the interim licence itself and the declarations made are designed to seek to fore on party to do something they clearly do not wish to do and have no intention of doing. . . (paras. 84, 86). 

Lord Justice Jackson agrees with both judgments (para. 89).