Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

As Many as Three Incompatible FRAND Judgments Before Breakfast

Within the past week, there have been three judgments rendered in the ongoing FRAND dispute between ZTE and Samsung.  (For discussion on this blog of earlier proceedings in this dispute, see here.)  On Friday, Mr. Justice Meade issued his decision in Samsung Elecs. Co. v. ZTE Corp., [2026] EWHC 999 (Pat.) (Eng.).  In this action for a declaratory judgment, brought by net licensee Samsung, the court determines that a court-determined global FRAND license pertaining to ZTE’s and Samsung’s portfolios would (1) cover both 4G and 5G technology, (2) run for five years, and (3) require a net payment from Samsung in the amount of $392 million.  This number is derived from one comparable, the 2020 SEP license between ZTE and Apple.  Because ZTE negotiated this license from a position of comparative weakness, in part due to U.S. sanctions levied against the firm, the court effectively increases the inferred amount by 21%, which results in a net amount of $392 million.  Meanwhile, it has been widely reported that on the very same day the Chongqing court, in which a parallel global FRAND rate determination has been ongoing, issued a decision applying a top-down methodology and awarding ZTE the full amount it had sought for a six-year license, namely $731 million.  Then today the ip fray blog reports that the Munich Regional Court issued a written decision (apparently not yet publicly available), following up its oral decision last week that ZTE was entitled to an injunction, in which the court states that in its view a five-year global FRAND royalty based upon a top-down methodology would be in the amount of $640 million.  The report indicates that the court urged the parties to settle.

Settlement would seem the most likely course to me at this juncture; but settlements occur in the shadow of the law, and so the question arises . . . well, what exactly is the law here?  In other words, if the parties don’t settle, what happens?

Without the text of the Chongqing decision, the answer to this question is necessarily somewhat speculative—and even with it, I’m not sure I know the answer, but I will hazard a few possibilities nonetheless.  First, since the English decision is (at this stage) only for a declaratory judgment, I think Samsung would have to follow up with a request for injunctive relief (within the U.K.) and/or specific performance, if it wanted to force ZTE to accede to Mr. Justice Meade’s terms.  But then the question would arise whether, if ZTE didn’t accede (or perhaps even if it did?), other jurisdictions would feel themselves bound to recognize the judgment.  I suspect the Chinese courts would not, particularly in view of the recently-published Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign States' Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Measures (which have been reported on elsewhere, and which may be the subject of a separate forthcoming blog post); and perhaps the German courts wouldn't either.  As for the Chongqing decision, if Samsung were to refuse to accede, I suspect that that court might enter an injunction against Samsung and/or permit the judgment to be levied against whatever assets Samsung has in China. Whether courts outside of China would enforce or recognize the judgment, however, remains to be seen; as readers are probably aware, the EU has a pending WTO complaint targeting China’s practice of establishing global FRAND royalties.  The German decision, if I understand correctly, would appear to force Samsung products off the market in Germany unless and until a license (covering at least whatever domestic SEP or SEPs are at issue in the Munich litigation) is concluded, but the court’s reported statements about the terms of a global FRAND license would not, in and of themselves, force Samsung to accede to those terms.  Whether other courts are persuaded by the Munich court's reasoning would be up to those courts.

These are all topics to which I will be giving a good deal of thought over the summer, as I work on an essay on IP and extraterritoriality.  I’m hoping as well that some of the well-regarded voices on private international law—that is, on general private international law not limited to the IP context, people such as Professors Bill Dodge and Curtis Bradley--will have something to say about this morass, and possibly how to resolve it.         

Friday, May 1, 2026

Landmark German Case on Patent Damages, Part 2

Continuing my discussion from Wednesday of the Judgment of the Munich Regional Court of Apr. 16, 2026, 7 O8367/25, the second portion of the decision centers on issues relating to awards of the infringer’s profits.  The court states that calculating the award involves three steps:  determining the infringer’s revenue, deducting the appropriately deductible costs, and determining the appropriate proportionality factor (Anteilsfaktor) (para. 61).  As for the first of these, the patentee can rely on the amount the infringer discloses pursuant to its disclosure obligation (Auskunftsverpflichtung) (para. 63).  In addition, the court says it is fundamentally irrelevant whether the claim is for direct or (as here) indirect infringement; in such a case, the revenues from all of the machines sold by the defendant and assumed to have been used for the purpose of practicing the patented technology are to be taken into account (para. 64).  (More on this issue below.)  Further, for sales made up to three months following expiration of the patent (sometimes referred to in English as “springboard” profits), the court believes that there should be a rebuttable presumption that these sales were the product of infringing offers made during the patent term (para. 65).  Extrapolating from the BGH’s decision in Polsterumarbeitungsmaschine (Judgment of Nov. 14, 2023, I ZR 30/21, discussed on this blog here), moreover, the patentee also is entitled to recover profits earned from additional business (Zusatzgeschäften, a term that in the context of patent law I would normally translate as “convoyed goods,” but I hesitate to use that term here because this is a case involving indirect rather than direct infringement), including goods that were sold after patent expiration but which are traceable to infringing conduct during the patent term (paras. 66-72).  These effects presumably dissipate over time, however, and so the court concludes that it is appropriate to presumes that the portion of such sales decreases in a linear fashion over a ten-year period—to wit, in the first year following patent expiration, the monetary recovery can be assessed at 100%, in the second year 90%, and so on (para. 72).  The court next turns its attention to deductible costs, which in general are the variable costs of production only and not the fixed costs, in accordance with the BGH’s Gemeinkostenanteil decision as I noted the other day (see paras. 73-88, going into some detail about which costs typically should be classified as variable and which fixed).  The court then turns its attention to causality and the proportionality factor, stating that this inquiry involves two steps:  determining the appropriate base (Bezugsgröße) and then the appropriate percentage of the profit to allocate to that base (para. 89).  Again it references the brake pad example noted on Wednesday, stating that

To answer the question of the extent to which the infringer’s profit is attributable to the infringement, the specific Bezugsgröße of the infringing product must first be determined. For example, if the infringed patent concerns a specific design of a brake pad for a motor vehicle, the proportion factor will vary depending on whether the vehicle, the brake system, or the brake pad is taken as the reference. The larger the Bezugsgröße chosen, the lower the proportion factor to be applied. Another factor in determining the Bezugsgröße is whether the patent protects a minor improvement or a completely novel invention. It is also relevant whether alternatives exist on the market and whether the product is emotionally charged (e.g., a brand-name product), which is generally unlikely to be the case (para. 91).

 Tying together the proportionality factor and the presumption of springboard profits, the court states that

. . . when determining the causality factor, it must be noted that subsequent transactions concluded after the expiration of the patent’s term are likely to be based less and less on the infringement of the intellectual property right over the years (the “blurry factor”—derived from the English term “blurry”: blurred).  In its Polsterumarbeitungsmaschine decision, the BGH does not postulate a right of the patent holder to perpetual participation in the profits generated by the patent infringer through subsequent transactions. Rather, the intention is to achieve a fair balance of interests. Therefore, the Chamber assumes that follow-on transactions are generally included for a period of 10 years after patent expiration, and that the proportion of the infringer’s profits attributable to the patent infringement decreases by 10% of the baseline value each year. This means that, in the first step, the causation factor must be determined as the base value, for example, 50%. This value is to be applied for the first year. In the second year, only 45% is to be applied, in the third year 40%, and so on (para. 92).

The decision concludes with the application of this methodology to the facts of the case.  The defendant sold 28 machines (25 during the patent term, 3 within one month of expiration), which generated revenue of €1,994.312, from which the court deducts €986,365.40 in variable costs; the court then determines that the appropriate causality factor is 50%, reasoning that, although “the machine is solely suited to carrying out the patent-infringing process,” “particularly with such expensive machines, other factors also play a role in the purchase decision, such as the defendant’s reputation or the quality of the services it offers in connection with the machines” (para. 118).   The resulting sum is, according to the court, €503,972.80 (I get €503,973.30; not sure what accounts for the missing 50 cents).  The revenue from the sales of 26 canisters of solvent sold during the patent term amounts to €531,611.32, from which €245,486.08 is deductible, leaving €286,125.24, to which the court applies a causality factor of 70%, resulting in €200,287.67.  The court then turns to solvents sold post-expiration but before the court hearing (36 months), and comes up with a figure of €397.26 in profit per machine per month (I’m not quite following the math here), to which the “blurry factor” analysis leads to a reduction of 10%, resulting in €360,394.27.  So overall, the award is €1,064.654.74, plus interest.  

So, to summarize, in a case in which the defendant was found to have engaged in indirect infringement by selling machines and solvent used by third parties to perform the patented process, the patentee is entitled to recover an allocable share of the profits earned on the sale of those machines and solvent, including a portion of the profits earned on sales made post-expiration.  (Although the name of the solvent is redacted, my sense is that it is a staple article of commerce.  I should also mention, perhaps, that the defendant is appealing the underlying liability determination.)  Overall, I think this is pretty remarkable.

In and of themselves, awards of damages (or, in countries where the law so permits, profits) for Zugeschäften are not so remarkable, assuming that there is sufficient proof of a causal connection between the infringement and those sales—although with respect to convoyed goods as such, the law in the U.S., unlike in the U.K., France, and Germany, imposes an additional limitation that the damages must “function together with the patented component in some manner so as to produce a desired end product or result.”   See Rite-Hite Co. v. Kelley Corp., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (stating further that “[a]ll the components together must be analogous to components of a single assembly or be parts of a complete machine, or they must constitute a functional unit,” and that “precedent has not extended liability to include items that have essentially no functional relationship to the patented invention and that may have been sold with an infringing device only as a matter of convenience or business advantage”).  Recovery of springboard damages or profits also are not so remarkable either, again assuming proof of a sufficient connection between the infringing conduct and sales made post-expiration.  German law, however, as evidenced by the Posterumarbeitungsmaschine decision, already had gone one step further, in permitting the recovery of profits on springboard convoyed sales.  And now this decision applies that logic to the induced infringement of a process patent. 

Even if we put aside for the moment the question of whether the court’s presumptions pertaining to post-expiration profits are sound, something about awarding the profits earned by an indirect infringer on its sales to the direct infringer of machines and solvent used for carrying out the patented process seems odd to me.  Suppose, for example, that a direct infringer benefits from the use of a patented process because the process reduces its costs of production by €150; but that to carry out the process, it must first buy equipment that costs it €50, so its net benefit from using the process is €100.  Suppose further that the seller of the equipment (who, let’s assume, will be liable under applicable law for some form of indirect infringement) incurs costs of €25 to produce that equipment, and thus earns a €25 profit on sales of the equipment to the third party.  Alternatively, suppose that the equipment costs the direct infringer €100 but still only costs €25 for the indirect infringer to manufacture.  The direct infringer’s net benefit is now €50 and the equipment manufacturer’s profit is €75.  In either case, the optimal outcome ex ante would have been for the direct infringer to agree to pay a royalty for the use of the use of the process, in some amount up to €150 minus the cost of the equipment used to carry out the process.  If the price of the equipment was €50, the direct infringer should have paid a royalty of up to €100, but on these facts the patentee who sues the indirect infringer can recover only €25 (assuming that profits are an available measure of monetary recovery).  Conversely, if the price of the equipment was €100, the direct infringer should have paid a royalty of up to €50, but the patentee who sues the indirect infringer can recover €75.  In neither case is the award of profits really tethered to the value of the use to the direct infringer, which would seem to me to be the more appropriate measure.  Of course, this is just a stylized example, and I suppose one could argue that a rule allowing for the recovery of either the direct or indirect infringer’s profit encourages the parties to negotiate ex ante rather than to infringe.  Even so, it seems like an odd result to me, though I need to give the matter some more thought.   (On the topic of damages for indirect infringement, see this article by the late Professor Dmitri Karshtedt, which I noted here.)

Another thing that is striking about the decision is the court’s summoning out of thin air its three-month, ten-year, and “blurry factor” presumptions.  Oddly enough, in a talk earlier this week to a group in the Netherlands, I mentioned at one point how the conventional view is that common-law judges have some measure of discretion to make law in response to changing circumstances, whereas civil-law judges are constrained to follow the code; but in fact, it’s not very difficult to come up with examples in which civil law judges have sometimes crafted judge-made standards dehors the text.  The example I actually had in mind when I made the comment was the development by French and German courts, over a hundred years ago, of moral rights in copyright law, though later I thought about the Huawei v. ZTE “dance” as articulated by the CJEU and further refined by the UPC and domestic courts; and the above decision would seem to be yet another example.  Meanwhile in the U.S., our (in my view, sometimes excessively) textualist-minded courts seem to be moving in precisely the opposite direction, as witness, e.g., cases like Romag Fasteners (discarding both precedent and common sense in adopting a literal reading of the Lanham Act's provision on disgorgement of profits, see discussion here), AMG Capital Management (in contrast, holding that the FTC cannot seek disgorgement of profits, see discussion here), or in a related vein Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (holding that the Judiciary Act of 1789 precludes U.S. district courts from entering injunctions of a type that were unknown in 1789).  Freaky Friday, anyone?

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Landmark German Case on Patent Damages, Part 1

Earlier this week, ip fray published a post discussing and excerpting a recent decision of the Seventh Chamber of the Munich I Regional Court, specifically the Judgment of Apr. 16, 2026, 7 O 8367/25.  The patent at issue is the German portion of EP 1 501 669 B1, for a “smoothing method for layered deposition modeling,” used in layered manufacturing techniques.  (I was interested to see that the inventors are from Eden Prairie, Minnesota, not much more than a stone’s throw from my house.)  The patent has expired, but the defendants were found to have engaged in indirect infringement during the patent term by selling machines and solvents used to carry out the process.  The present decision therefore focuses on damages, ultimately awarding €1,064,654.70 for the sale of 28 devices and 266 16-liter units of solvent (paras. 39-40), both used for carrying out the process.  But because “there are therefore few decisions regarding the amount of damages,” the court perceives “a need for judicial clarification on exactly how damages should be calculated. This is particularly necessary because, as a result of the European Court of Justice’s ‘BSH-Hausgeräte’ decision (GRUR 2025, 568), national courts are likely to have to deal with an increasing number of centralized claims for damages” (para. 42; I’ll be using machine translations throughout, subject to some adjustments of my own from the original German).  So beginning with paragraph 43 of the decision, the court sets out what it views as the relevant principles for calculating damages.  (These are summarized in the decision’s headnotes at the beginning of the decision, and these headnotes are the focus of the ip fray article.)  Overall, this appears to be quite an important decision, so I am dividing up my discussion and analysis into at least a couple of parts, with today’s post centering on the court's general statements regarding lost profits, royalties, and infringer's profits.

First, the court compares the three methods of determining damages (the aforementioned lost profits, royalties, and infringer’s profits), stating that the first of these is the hardest to prove but also tends to be result in a higher amount.  Reasonable royalties are comparatively easy to prove, and infringer’s profits something of a compromise between the two (para. 49), though the latter are not dependent on the amount of the patentee’s loss (para. 47).  This all seems largely correct to me, from an economic standpoint, although I would also point out that the infringer’s profit could be higher than the patentee’s own lost profit, if for example the infringer reaches markets the patentee doesn’t or is a more efficient producer of the patented article.  Overall, though, this discussion is in my view a welcome change from something I recall haven previously seen (see my discussion here) suggesting that in principle all three methods should converge on the same amount.

Second, the court notes that patentees’ reluctance to disclose their own financial information means that there are few decisions in which lost profits are awarded.  The court appears (to me) to want to change this, stating that all the patentee really needs to do is to prove its unit price and to offer the expert opinion of an auditor of what costs should be deducted (para. 51).  Moreover, the need to prove causation need not be insurmountable; all the patentee must do is prove a decline in sales following the infringement, and a rebuttable presumption then arises that these are caused by the infringement (para. 52).  The court suggests that the infringer can try to rebut the presumption through, perhaps, market reports--though the ip fray article suggests that in practice the presumption may be hard to overcome, because of the limited discovery available to defendants.

Third, the court says that patent owners can combine a lost profits award with a reasonable royalty or an award of profits, in cases in which the decrease in sales is at least partly attributable to other factors, or the infringer reaches additional markets that the patent owner didn’t serve.  But reasonable royalties can’t be combined with infringer’s profits (para. 53), all of which seems economically correct to me.

Fourth, in line with the BGH’s 2001 Gemeinkostenanteil decision, as a general rule when calculating an award of infringer’s profits, only the infringer’s direct costs should be deducted from its revenue (para. 54).  (The non-deductibility of allocable overhead, of course, leads to higher awards.)  In addition, however, the court stresses the importance of determining the extent to which the infringer’s profit is attributable to the infringement.  In this regard, it is essential to determine the appropriate base (Bezugsgröße).  Here, the court uses as an example an infringing brake pad.  In comparison with the entire vehicle the brake pad portion (Anteil) is vanishingly small; in comparison with the brake assembly, it is small; and in comparison with the brake pad itself it is, of course, 100% (para. 55).  In this regard, especially for a very small component of an entire product, the portion may be determined not be means of a percent but rather as a multiple of the standard license rate (para. 56).  In contrast, for machines which make use of a method or device claim, typically the percentage can be presumed to be 50% (para. 57).      

Fifth, a reasonable royalty can be viewed as a “safe harbor,” and the requirements for calculating it are minimal (niedrig).  The revenue from infringing products should be evident from the disclosure the defendant is required to make (in German, the Auskunft), after which it is necessary to determine the base (entire machine or component) and the typical license rate.  According to the court, the standard rate varies from 1% in the automobile industry to 10% for high-quality mechanical engineering (para. 58).  (The ip fray article suggest that these rates could really add up, since in Germany a separate action is required for each patent that is asserted by the plaintiff.  Or would the court take this procedural matter into account in calculating royalties, to avoid overcompensation?)

Sixth, the court states that because of differences between a negotiated license and license rate that is determined followed a finding of infringement, the latter can be higher, citing the Munich court’s 2010 Gülleausbringung decision (which I blogged about here).  This makes economic sense, since the infringer avoids certain risks that the voluntary licensee undertakes, and also because prior to final judgment there often will be some uncertainty as to infringement (though in Germany, there still may be substantial uncertainty as to validity, since the invalidation proceedings are separate from infringement proceedings).  As to the amount of the enhancement, the court says it can be up to three times higher (para. 59).  This actually seems pretty high to me, in view of the latter point about validity still potentially being in dispute.  

There is a lot more to the decision—some of it potentially quite path-breaking—including discussion of apportionment of profits, damages for convoyed goods, and springboard damages.  I will continue with my next installment on this decision in a few days.

Thursday, April 23, 2026

Kapischke on Interim Licenses and AILIs

Justus Kapischke has published an article titled Interim Licences and Anti-Interim-Licence Injunctions:  Semi-strict non-interference or rules for the race?, 5/2026 GRUR 275.  Here is the abstract:

This article analyses and provides background information on two recent decisions of the LG Munich I and the LD Mannheim.  In both decisions, the courts react negatively to the English practice of awarding interim licence declarations in FRAND disputes, enjoining implementers from applying for such relief.  The LD Mannheim further offers its opinion on the limits of final FRAND determinations in England.

The decisions at issue are, of course, Judgment of Nov. 26, 2025, LG Munich I, 21 O 12112/25, and InterDigital VC Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., UPC_CFI_936/2025 (LD Mannheim Dec. 22, 2025), both of which entered anti-interim license injunctions (AILIs) directed against Amazon.  (Both decisions are also excerpted in this same issue of GRUR, at pp. 313-30.  The appeal from the Mannheim LD decision will be heard on May 28.)  The author ably illustrates the incompatibility of the English approach to FRAND disputes (under which the court’s task, ultimately, is to set a rate) and the German/UPC approaches (which to date have focused on conduct), writing that “[a] foreign court making injunctions unavailable by ordering the SEP holder to grant a licence interferes with the incentive structure of injunction focused approaches,” whereas “conduct-based injunctions may force settlement before any court had the chance to establish FRAND terms either by determining them or by confirming the FRANDness of the SEP-holder’s offer, frustrating a rate-setting approach” (p.177).  He questions some of the analysis of the above two decisions, noting that they both seem premised on the coercive effect of an English declaration concerning interim licenses (effectively equating them to antisuit injunctions), even though “it is clear that interim licences do not force an SEP-holder to accept rate-setting proceedings in the implementer’s preferred forum” (p.179).  True, the SEP holder’s refusal to comply with the declaration could result in its being deemed an unwilling licensor, but the author states that the SEP holder’s seeking an AILI is “unlikely to change anything about that” (p.180).  (In addition, it would seem to me, the odds that the SEP holder would obtain an injunction in the U.K. are pretty negligible anyway, aren’t they?)  In addition, he notes both courts’ emphasis on the territorial nature of patents, which however in a strictly jurisdictional sense “appears not to be the current law in Germany or the EU as exemplified by the ECJ’s judgment in BSH” (p.182).  I’m glad to see someone making this connection, which seems quite important to me.  The author argues, however, that strict territoriality is not the Mannheim LD’s position, but rather only what he refers to as “semi-strict” territoriality in the sense that “courts can, on behalf of SEP holders, impose their view of global FRAND licences on implementers by way of injunctions,” but implementers “may not use similarly coercive measures as means of imposing global FRAND determinations on SEP holders, since this would interfere with foreign infringement proceedings” (p.182).  I’m not entirely sure of the author’s view here, but I’m not convinced of the merits of this distinction.  (I plan to explore the question more deeply in a forthcoming essay I will contributing to the Research Handbook on Extraterritoriality and Intellectual Property, which I mentioned here the other day.  Consistent with the author’s observation that “both sides can at least plausibly accuse each other of having taken the first ASI-like measure” (id.), it has long seemed to me that when courts start issuing ASIs, AASIs, AILIs, declarations concerning interim licenses, and so on, it is awfully difficult to say which jurisdiction is the one violating the comity norm.)  The author closes by suggesting that it would be helpful “to obtain authoritative constructions of the relevant (F)RAND undertakings from the French of Swiss courts,” and also if SEP holders “offer[ ] to refrain from seeking injunctive relief if the implementer agrees to be bound by a rate-setting procedure in Germany or at the UPC” (id.).  Might the German courts and/or UPC ever head in this direction?      

Tuesday, March 17, 2026

UPC’s Hamburg L.D. Concludes that Infringing Offer Caused No Proven Damages

The decision is Fives ECL v. REEL GmbH, UPC_CFI_274/2023, issued on February 11, 2026.  The decision is the subject of a recent blog post on ip fray.  Last June, I blogged about an earlier decision (of the UPC Court of Appeal) in this dispute, writing that “the patent owner had obtained from a German national court a judgment of infringement, prior to June 1, 2023, and a declaration that the defendant would be liable for damages; but it thereafter pursued its damages claim before the UPC.  The UPC Court of Appeal held that the UPC was competent to hear the damages claim (but left open the question of whether national or UPC law would apply to that claim).”  The current decision holds that German domestic law applies to the damages claim, but that it wouldn’t matter in any event in view of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive (paras. 100-10).  More interesting, however, is the court’s conclusion that, although the defendant was adjudicated to have made an infringing offer, it isn’t liable for any damages.  A copy of the original decision, in German, is linked to above; below, I use a machine translation that I have compared with the original.

The patent in suit is EP  c1 740 740 B1, for a “compact service module which is intended for electrolytic aluminium production plants.”  Plaintiff and defendant compete “in the market for special purpose cranes, which are used worldwide in various countries in aluminum furnaces as part of aluminum production” (para. 5).  In December 2016, the parties submitted competing bids for a project in Bahrain, which was to be built by Bechtel.  The first offers, dated December 2, were for twelve service modules and auxiliary bridges.  Defendant’s offer was higher than plaintiff’s.  Bechtel then requested that the parties provide a price “in the event these two parts were split and continued separately,” which the parties responded to on December 15.  Defendant offered a price reduction, while the plaintiff did not (para. 70).  Plaintiff didn’t get the contract; but then Bechtel decided to reopen the bidding process, and plaintiff submitted a new bid on February 21, 2017, which included a price decrease of €6,500,000.  Apparently plaintiff was then awarded the contract, but it (successfully) sued the defendant for having made an infringing offer, which it then followed up with this claim for lost profits.

The court rejects the claim for lost profits, for failure of proof as to amount and for lack of proof of causation.  From what I gather, the plaintiff didn’t proffer the December or February offers to the court (see paras. 18, 47), but rather sought to rely on evidence of (1) the defendant’s typical profit margin, according to the latter’s publicly available financial data from 2011-16, and (2) “projects implemented by the plaintiff in the past” (para. 51).  The former, however, is not sufficient proof, given that “defendant’s activities span multiple business segments,” and also that the submitted evidence reports the defendant’s gross margin (Bruttomarge), which may not be comparable to the profit margin for this project.  The latter as well is not sufficient, because the projects “predate the tender for the [present project] by eight to thirteen years,” “included contracts with a wide range of volumes,” and were reflective in part of both the greater market power enjoyed by the plaintiff at those earlier dates and a better economic environment generally for aluminum manufacturers and suppliers.  In addition, the court casts doubt on the technical advantage provided by the patented technology in comparison with alternatives (discussed further below), and concludes that in any event there is no evidence that any assumed advantage over the state of the art could justify the plaintiff’s alleged margin.  Moreover, the defendant’s bid included an “erection and installation concept” that Bechtel favored, to the point of requesting the plaintiff to include a similar concept in its proposal when bidding reopened—which “contradicts the assumption that the plaintiff would have prevailed in a hypothetical scenario without the defendant’s patent-infringing bid,” insofar as “the defendant had a competitive advantage over the plaintiff that was independent of the” machinery at issue (paras. 76-77).

Finally, we come to the causation issue.  The court begins this section by stating that it cannot “be ruled out that, even if the defendant had submitted an alternative offer that did not infringe the patent, the plaintiff would have had to reduce its offer of December 2/15, 2016” (para. 78).  Here, the analysis gets a bit confusing, with the court first seeming to indicate that the existence of a noninfringing alternative is irrelevant to the plaintiff’s entitlement to lost profits, and then appearing to walk it back:

79 As a general rule, the claim—in this case, the asserted loss of profits—cannot be countered by the defense of lawful alternative conduct (see BGH, GRUR 2024, 1201, para. 43 et seq. – Verdampfungstrockneranlage). According to the case law of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), the defense that the damage would have occurred even if lawful conduct had been adopted may be relevant for the attribution of the damage. The relevance of the defense depends on the protective purpose of the respective infringed provision (BGH NJW 2017, 1104, para. 24; BGHZ 194, 194 = GRUR 2012, 1226, para. 35 – Flaschenträger).

 

80 In the case of a patent infringement, the defense that the same economic result could have been achieved through non-infringing acts cannot, in principle, lead to the exclusion of a claim for damages. A patent does not preclude third parties from competing with the right holder by offering non-infringing products. However, the offering and placing on the market of the protected subject matter is reserved to the right holder. A culpable infringement of this exclusive right must result in the infringer having to compensate for the resulting damage even if he could have offered other products. These principles also apply to the patent-infringing offering of a product.

 

81 These principles do not apply in the present case. This is because it is undisputed between the parties that the customer would always have requested a second offer in order to foster competition . . . .

 

82 If one therefore assumes that a non-infringing alternative offer must be included in the assessment, it cannot be definitively established that the plaintiff would certainly have been awarded the contract with its original offer.

The court then goes on to explain why the defendant’s Pavlodar model would have been both technically and economically more attractive than the proposals the plaintiff submitted in December 2016.  As a consequence, as stated above, the plaintiff fails to prove that it “would certainly have been awarded the contract with its original offer” (paras. 83-89).

I’ve noted (what I view as) similar inconsistencies in the German courts’ analyses of noninfringing alternatives before, for example in my June 2024 post on the Verdampungstrockneranlage decision cited above.  Maybe it’s fair to say, however, that under German law, the existence of a noninfringing alternative doesn’t necessarily preclude the plaintiff from recovering damages for infringement, but that the plaintiff still must present evidence as to the amount of those damages; and where, as here, it proceeds instead with an untenable lost profits theory, it gets nothing, though perhaps under other circumstances it would still be entitled a reasonable royalty—as may have been the case in Verdampfungstrockneranlage, where it is conceivable that there was some value to the defendant in making an infringing offer within Germany, as opposed to a noninfringing offer somewhere else, even if the end result would have been the same in that the defendant would have been awarded the contract (for a noninfringing project carried out outside of Germany).  If so, the German position may not be all that different from the U.S. position, under which (as reflected in cases such as Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 189 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), the existence of a noninfringing alternative means that the plaintiff can’t recover a lost profit (because it wouldn’t have made the allegedly forgone sales even absent the infringement), but the plaintiff may still recover a reasonable royalty reflecting the cost saving the defendant incurred by having used the patented technology over the noninfringing technology. 

In any event, my most recent effort to compare and contrast the law of noninfringing alternatives can be found at page 144 of my book Remedies in Intellectual Property Law, where I note that, although Canadian and French case law seems more or less consistent with the U.S. approach, the U.K. courts “continue to follow the House of Lords’ 1888 decision in United Horse-Shoe & Nail Co. v. John Stewart & Co., holding that the existence of noninfringing alternatives is irrelevant” to both lost profits and awards of infringer’s profits (though the U.K. courts recognize that noninfringing alternatives are relevant to reasonable royalties); and that “German courts also have held that the existence of noninfringing alternatives does not preclude an award of lost profits, though such evidence can affect the amount awarded,” citing both Verdampfungstrockneranlage  and Flaschenträger.

Monday, February 23, 2026

Judge Albright’s Order in BMW v. Onesta

As noted on this blog previously (see here and here), in December Judge Alan Albright (W.D. Tex.) issued a temporary restraining order, later converted into a preliminary injunction, ordering U.S. patent assertion entity Onesta from adjudicating claims against BMW for the infringement of U.S. patents in the Munich Regional Court.  On February 13, the judge issued his written order explaining his reasoning.  The order is available on Westlaw (2026 WL 474871) and from other sources, such as Pacer.

By way of background, one year ago the Court of Justice for the European Union issued its decision in BSH v. Electrolux.  In that case, the owner of a European Patent filed an action in Sweden, against a defendant domiciled in Sweden, for the infringement not only of the Swedish part of the patent in suit, but also for the infringement of the corresponding parts validated in nine other European Patent Convention (EPC) member states--including at least one (Türkiye) which is not an EU member.  One of the questions presented was whether the Brussels Regulation Recast conferred exclusive jurisdiction over a Turkish court in respect of the part validated in Turkey.  The court held that it did not, but rather that the Swedish court may adjudicate both the infringement and validity of the Turkish part, although the validity ruling would apply only inter partes (in other words, the effect of the ruling would not be to nullify the Turkish part as against the world).  In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that

. . . the court of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled which is seised, as in the case in the main proceedings, on the basis of Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, of an infringement action in the context of which the issue of the validity of a patent granted or validated in a third State is raised as a defence, does have jurisdiction to rule on that issue if none of the restrictions referred to in paragraphs 63 to 65 of the present judgment is applicable, given that the decision of that court sought in that regard is not such as to affect the existence or content of that patent in that third State, or to cause its national register to be amended.

 

. . . As the Advocate General observed in point 62 of his Opinion of 22 February 2024 and as the parties to the main proceedings and the European Commission stated at the hearing on 14 May 2024 before the Court, that decision has only inter partes effects, that is to say, a scope limited to the parties to the proceedings. Thus, where the issue of the validity of a patent granted in a third State is raised as a defence in an action alleging infringement of that patent before a court of a Member State, that defence seeks only to have that action dismissed, and does not seek to obtain a decision that will cause that patent to be annulled entirely or in part. In particular, under no circumstances can that decision include a direction to the administrative authority responsible for maintaining the national register of the third State concerned (paras. 74-75).

The court’s reasoning does not, at least explicitly, appear to hinge on the “third State” being a party to the EPC, and thus could be cited in support of the Munich court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for the infringement of a U.S. patent in an action filed against a company (like BMW) domiciled in Germany.  Then again, as Judge Albright notes in his order, the BSH “decision never expressly grants long-arm authority to divest U.S. courts of jurisdiction to enforce U.S. patents.”  Fair enough.

In any event, in granting the ASI, Judge Albright goes through the Fifth Circuit’s test for granting an ASI, which is largely similar to what other U.S. circuits require.  First, it is undisputed that the parties to the U.S. and Munich actions are the same, and the U.S. action (BMW’s action for a declaratory judgment of patent misuse, noninfringement, and invalidity) would dispose of the relevant issues in Munich.  Second, the Munich action would “frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction” or, alternatively, would “cause prejudice or offend other equitable principles.”  In this regard, he writes that “[a]llowing the Munich proceedings to continue threatens the United States' policy interest in adjudicating its own patents and protecting litigants' jury rights in infringement cases. Similarly, proceedings in the Munich court necessarily deprive BMW of critical defendant rights available only here—e.g., fact discovery; invalidity consideration with erga omnes effect; and juries as a bulwark against the improper grant or assertion of U.S. patents. . . .  [E]nsuring that U.S. patent infringement claims are adjudicated in U.S. courts is ‘necessary to provide full justice to the parties’ in this case because BMW seeks a jury trial on the infringement claims” (citation omitted).  Further, in Judge Albright’s reading, the Paris Convention “expressly affirms the independence of each country’s patent system and reserves the ‘provisions . . . relating to . . .  jurisdiction’ to each member state” (quoting Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 898-99 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).  In addition, although there is case law authorizing the adjudication of U.S. copyright claims in foreign courts (and, I would note, vice versa), the court notes that “[u]nlike with copyrights, receiving patent protections in the U.S. requires a rigorous application and examination process”; and he cites the act of state doctrine, which in general counsels against second-guessing the exercise of another state’s sovereign authority.  Third, the court finds that an ASI would not offend international comity because “comity is implicated by ‘public international issues,’ but not ‘private’ disputes” (though one might ask, if that is the case, why courts should bother considering comity at all in the context of deciding whether to grant an ASI in a private dispute).  He does note, however, that

 

There are factors present in this case that are abnormal in the ASI context. For instance, the Court is unaware of any cases where an ASI has been granted to terminate the first filed proceedings between the parties. Moreover, this case features the unusual argument by Onesta that BMW would be inconvenienced by defending in a forum outside of its domicile, while BMW seeks courts outside its domicile. . . . But there is no recognized first-filed principle. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The mere filing of a suit in one forum does not cut off the preexisting right of an independent forum to regulate matters subject to its prescriptive jurisdiction.”); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 887 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The order in which the domestic and foreign suits were filed ... [is] not dispositive.”). And making sure that U.S. patents are tried in U.S. courts, which regularly apply U.S. patent law is more “convenien[t]” for the courts of each sovereign. . . .Finally, given Onesta's domicile in the United States and BMW's desire to litigate here, the Court finds that neither party would be inconvenienced by doing so. . . .

It will be interesting to see what happens on appeal if the parties do not settle the matter or at least agree to some procedure for resolving it--though I suspect that under U.S. law it may be difficult to overturn the decision on appeal.  Nevertheless, here are a few random thoughts:

1.     The court invokes the United States’ interest in adjudicating its own patents and protecting litigants’ rights to a jury trial, to fact discovery, and to an invalidity determination with erga omnes effect.  But of course all of those things would be unavailable in a case in which a foreign court adjudicates foreign copyright rights, about which the court is more sanguine.  And is it really true that the adjudication of U.S. patent infringement claims in a U.S. court is “necessary to provide full justice to the parties” because BMW seeks a jury trial?  To my knowledge, no other country in the world provides jury trials in patent infringement actions (or discovery to the same extent the U.S. does, for that matter); does that mean that every country’s system is unjust?  I suppose the response would be no, it’s just that actions for the infringement of U.S. patent rights come with a guarantee of right to trial by jury, as a matter of U.S. constitutional law (and regardless of whether the party requesting a jury is the plaintiff or the defendant, domestic or foreign), and therefore the Munich court’s inability to convene a jury would render its decision on U.S. patent infringement claims unjust.  But again, if that is true, why isn’t it true for copyright claims—or other instances in which foreign courts might make determinations under U.S. law?

2.  A more serious problem, in my view, is that in countries such as Germany infringement and validity determinations are bifurcated—determined by different courts in different proceedings—such that a judgment of infringement may be entered with regard to a patent later determined to be invalid (the “injunction gap”).  Moreover, injunctive relief in favor of the prevailing patentee is near-automatic, indeed often viewed as being part of the claim for relief, rather than merely a remedy as in Anglo-American law.  See my new book, p.10 n.23 (stating that “in common law systems the law of remedies is viewed as something of a stand-alone discipline, albeit one that may be applied in different ways in relation to different bodies of private law.  In civil law countries such as Germany, by contrast, rights and remedies are viewed as being more closely connected, such that, as indicated in the text above, the infringement of a patent (for example) almost always results in the entry of an injunction. See Franz Hofmann and Franziska Kurz, Introduction to the “Law of Remedies,” in Law of Remedies: A European Perspective 3, 5 (Franz Hofmann and Franziska Kurz eds., Intersentia Ltd. 2019) (stating that “[u]nlike in common law countries, the question is not: which remedies are available to cure a wrong? Instead, German lawyers comprehend the legal system as a compilation of ‘subjective rights’”).”  So if a German court were to decide the infringement action against BMW, would it have to depart from its standard practice and consider whether the U.S. patent is valid?  Would the availability of an injunction be determined under German or under U.S. (eBay) law?  Beats me—but I can see why BMW, despite not being “inconvenienced” by litigating in its home forum, might prefer to take its chances in Texas, despite the possible risk of a larger damages award under U.S. law, if the case were to proceed that far.

3.  As many readers know, German courts generally disapprove of other states granting ASIs directed against the litigation of disputes or the enforcement of judgments in German courts.  That perspective may not matter so much here, however, if the German court itself would prefer not to have to decide some of the questions above, or if it would be inclined in any event to stay the adjudication of the U.S. patents pending proceedings in the U.S. (something the CJEU expressly suggested as a possibility in a case in which an E.U. court is asked to adjudicate a claim arising under another E.U. member state’s law).  But let’s imagine, just for the sake of argument, a case in which an E.U. court was asked to adjudicate a claim for the infringement of a U.S. patent and was not willing to cede jurisdiction to the U.S. court that enjoins the E.U. plaintiff from proceeding in the E.U.; maybe the E.U. court issues an AASI in response.  Which country is violating the comity norm:  the country issuing the ASI (which, one could agree, indirectly interferes with the operation of a foreign court), or the court that claims the right to adjudicate foreign patent claims (which, one could argue, indirectly interferes with the operation of its counterpart)?  Note that the WTO arbitration award last summer in the dispute between the EU and China can be read as disapproving both of ASIs (that is, disapproving of them beyond the context of the Chinese ASI policy at issue) and of the adjudication of foreign IP rights.  See my post on the WTO decision here, points 6b and 6c.  Then again, what precedential value, if any, does a WTO arbitration award have?

4.  There is some non-binding authority under U.S. law that might disagree with the position staked out by Judge Albright in BMW.  For example, section 211 of the American Law Institute’s 2007 Principles of the Law—Intellectual Property, titled “Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Claims,” recommends that, in general, “a court is competent to adjudicate claims arising under foreign laws pertaining to the subject matter of these Principles,” as long as it has subject matter and personal matter jurisdiction under local law, and as long as “[a] judgment holding registered rights granted under the laws of another State invalid is effective only to resolve the dispute between or among the parties to the action.”  Similarly, in her dissent in Voda v. Cordis, 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Judge Pauline Newman disputed, among other things, the characterization of patent grants as “acts of state” (as opposed to ministerial acts) for purposes of the act of state doctrine, and also did not believe that the Paris Convention or TRIPS Agreement “prohibits resolution by a national court of private disputes that include foreign patent rights.  She wrote:

The panel majority raises the specter that foreign courts might adjudicate United States patent rights, proposing that if our courts are permitted to decide questions under foreign patent law, other countries will feel free to decide questions of United States patent law. Cordis too sounds the alarm, stating that creative litigants will choose exotic foreign forums to resolve complex patent issues, and that the district court's decision will open the door to international chaos. I doubt that a United States district court is an exotic foreign forum; and it is not new for courts in other countries to apply the law of other nations when warranted. . . . All nations have recognized their obligation to provide a judicial forum to address disputes involving their citizens; no warrant has been shown to remove foreign patents from this purview.

Judge Newman’s dissent did not expressly grapple with Paris Convention articles 2(3) and 4bis, however, though perhaps an argument could be made that neither provision necessarily or inherently entails exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction.  Whether that is the correct reading of the Convention, I’m not sure.  

Thursday, February 12, 2026

Aggregate Royalties for Cellular SEPs

Nadia Soboleva and John Hayes have published an article titled Aggregate Royalty for Cellular SEPs in Recent Court Decisions, 11/2025 GRUR Patent 546.  Here is the abstract:

 

Standards organizations developing cellular communication standards typically require participants to disclose standard essential patents (SEPs) and agree to license such patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. When courts are asked to adjudicate license disputes involving SEPs, they often calculate the implied aggregate royalty for all SEPs in the relevant standard associated with a potential license.  We review five recently litigated FRAND cases and report the aggregate royalty per mobile device in most of these decisions falls in a range from $3 to $16, with an average of $9.25.  The aggregate royalty by the UK Court of Appeal in Optis/Apple is an outlier of $39.47.

The five cases are the U.S. TCL v. Ericsson decision, Unwired Planet, InterDigital v. Lenovo, Optis v. Apple, and the Chinese Oppo v. Nokia decision.  The authors write that these cases “encompass the only publicly available decisions that set a worldwide FRAND royalty for the 4G or 5G cellular standards.”

A few quick things to note.  First, the authors are both from Charles River Associates, and they note that they “have worked on multiple projects involving SEPs, including some of the matters discussed in” their article.  Second, I haven’t endeavored to check the authors’ analysis against the decisions they discuss.  I have no reason too question their analysis, but for now I am just reporting what they state.  Third, a range of $3 to $16 seems pretty broad to me, even without Optis/Apple (the appeal from which is pending before the U.K. Supreme Court).  Fourth, as noted previously on ip fray, the Munich Regional Court recently suggested in its decision involving Wilus and Asus that a rate of 10-18% for all SEPs reasonably necessary for operation of a mobile device would be within the FRAND range (see decision here, para. 294:  “Ausgehend von diesem Wert für den wichtigsten Standard (Mobilfunk) liegt die Gesamtbelastung für ein Mobiltelefon für alle für einen sinnvollen Betrieb erforderlichen Standards (Mobilfunk, Wi-Fi, Streaming, etc.) bei ca. 10% bis 18%.”).  For a mid-priced phone, that would be substantially higher than the aggregate royalty the above authors report, assuming that they and the Munich court are talking about the aggregate royalty burden for the same combinations of technologies.  Fifth, even if these are the only decisions available for the purpose of the study, five cases are a small sample, and whether the derived amounts accurately reflect FRAND rates depends on whether the courts in these cases got their numbers right; and some commentators have critiqued the methodology employed in, e.g., Unwired Planet.   Even so, one might be inclined to think that the Munich court’s range seems rather high, all things considered.

Monday, February 9, 2026

New EC Study on IPRED

There already has been a lot going on in the IP world this year, especially in relation to SEPs  in the U.K., Germany, and China; and unfortunately, I am still a bit underwater for a variety of reasons--including the fact I’m teaching one-and-a-half-new courses this semester; the release of my new book Remedies in Intellectual Property Law; and going through edits (and very soon, page proofs) for my other new (forthcoming) book, Wrongful Patent Assertion.  As I work on catching up on the backlog, I thought I should mention the recent publication of the European Commission‘s Follow-up study on the application of the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, which I have begun reading.  For now, I will note a few things, mostly from the Executive Summary. and expect to have more to say about some of these issues in the weeks to come.  (As Florian Mueller notes on ip fray, the research that went into the study was concluded in 2024, so there isn’t much there about the UPC.  But what the report does address is, in my view, of substantial interest.) 

As stated in the Executive Summary, the study focuses on “five priority research topics”:  proportionality; PAEs; dynamic blocking injunctions; information sharing and data protection; and costs for the destruction of infringing goods.  Of these, the first two are of greatest relevance to patent law (though all are important to IP law, and my new remedies book provides some measure of discussion of blocking injunctions, the right to information, and the destruction remedy).  One thing that caught my attention is that, according to the study, in patent cases courts in EU member states grant permanent injunctions in 94% of cases, and that “proportionality was explicitly assessed in only 0.6% of these cases.” This is not exactly surprising, but it is interesting to see the statistics.  The study suggests that it might be useful to have some sort of harmonized criteria for determining when proportionality should limit matters such as injunctive relief and destruction orders, and in this regard “concludes that the Commission could issue guidelines defining factors which courts should assess when applying the proportionality principle, such as i) the nature of the plaintiff, ii) the economic harm suffered by the parties, and iii) the public interest.”  The full discussion of proportionality, found in section 3.1 of the report (pp. 27-50), includes some comparative analysis from different member states; discussion of some leading cases; and possible avenues for reform.  As for PAEs, the study states that “their presence in the EU remains relatively limited” compared to the U.S., but also notes that “the data could be showing only the tip of the iceberg as parties may settle disputes outside the courts.”  It also “found that PAEs are highly concentrated in Germany,” and calls for greater transparency “particularly in jurisdictions such as Germany where court decisions are not systematically published.”  The full discussion of PAEs, found in section 3.2 (pp. 50-69), includes, among other things, discussion of why (according to Darts-IP) 90%+ of all PAE activity takes place in the U.S. (among them, no loser-pays rule except in exceptional cases, much higher damages awards, and lack of specialized trial courts), and also suggests that the development of proportionality guidelines could help to forestall (future?) abusive litigation by PAEs within the EU.

Tuesday, January 27, 2026

German Federal Supreme Court Rejects HMD’s Appeal

In 2024, the European Commission filed an amicus brief in a SEP case, VoiceAge v. HMD, urging the Munich Higher Regional Court to require strict compliance with the sequence of steps laid out in Huawei v. ZTE.  That court rejected the EC’s interpretation, as did the Higher Regional Court a few months later.  (For previous discussion on this blog, see here, here, and here.)  Today, the competition law senate of the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) rejected HMD’s appeal.  The press release (in German) is here; I would guess there will be a written decision to follow, at some point.  According to the press release, the Court concludes that, in accordance with the CJEU’s decision in Huawei v. ZTE and the BGH’s two previous decisions in FRAND-Einwand  I  and II, SEP owners are not hindered from enforcing their patents against unwilling licensees; and that the evidence in this case, which includes negotiations dating back to 2019, shows the implementer (HMD) to be an unwilling licensee.  Moreover—and consistent with the FRAND-Einwand  I  and II decisions (which, inter alia, require that implementers demonstrate their willingness to license throughout the entire course of negotiations in order to avoid injunctive relief)—the Court has no doubt that TFEU article 102 does not require strict compliance with the sequence of steps set forth in Huawei v. ZTE, and therefore concludes that it is not obligated to refer matter to the CJEU.  The court further sees no reason to address the appellate court’s requirement that, as part of the Huawei v. ZTE framework, the implementer must post security in the amount of the SEP owner’s offer, because in this case, it states, the security the defendant posted wasn’t even as high as its own counteroffer. 

Tuesday, January 20, 2026

Gervais on Territoriality and Global FRAND Rate-Setting

Daniel Gervais, one of the world’s leading experts on the TRIPS Agreement, has published a very interesting article titled The Principle of Territoriality in International Intellectual Property Law and Its Implications for Global FRAND Rate-Setting, GRUR Int. (advance access pdf available here).  Here is the abstract:

The principle of territoriality under which intellectual property (IP) rights exist and are enforced only within national borders sits uneasily alongside the global nature of standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing disputes. In recent years, courts in Brazil, China, Colombia, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and now the Unified Patent Court have asserted authority, directly or indirectly, to determine worldwide fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms, often without both parties’ consent. These practices, ranging from injunction-driven leverage to comprehensive judicial rate-setting, raise difficult questions about jurisdiction, comity, competition norms, and the coherence of international IP law.

 

This article provides a systematic and comparative analysis of the principle of territoriality in international IP law and its tension with non-consensual global FRAND determinations. It traces the origins and enduring role of territoriality in treaties such as the Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement, examines its implications for jurisdiction and choice of law, and explains why territoriality remains a cornerstone of global IP governance. It then turns to the distinctive case of SEPs, highlighting the role of standard-setting organizations and the unique licensing challenges they generate. Against this backdrop, the article maps national approaches across key jurisdictions, identifying functional categories (adjudicators, regulators, and leverage providers) and analyzing how their practices interact in transnational disputes.

 

Drawing on recent case law, WTO findings, and comparative treatment of other IP rights, the article argues that non-consensual global FRAND rate-setting undermines the territorial foundation of international IP law and risks destabilizing global markets. At the same time, it acknowledges arguments for efficiency and uniformity, and considers how these objectives might be pursued within a framework that respects sovereignty and due process. The article concludes by proposing both short-term and longer-term solutions, ranging from national court strategies and WTO enforcement to a possible role for WIPO, the US Congress, and the EU, designed to reconcile innovation incentives, market access, and the legitimacy of international dispute resolution.

I may have more comments to follow, but two things leap out to me upon first reading.  One is Professor Gervais’ argument that even the granting of purely domestic injunctions in FRAND cases, as in Germany, effectively albeit indirectly erodes the territoriality principle by “plac[ing] enormous pressure on the implementer to capitulate to the SEP holder’s terms” (p.13).  It might seem to follow from his analysis, then, that to uphold the territoriality principle nations would have to temper their enthusiasm for granting injunctions in at least some cases.  This may be right, though it also may seem a bit paradoxical that upholding the territorial principle under international law, as Professor Gervais understands it, would require nations to temper the use of a remedy (injunctions with domestic effect only, as a legal if not practical matter) that domestic law otherwise would permit in a given case.  (Again, that may be right—the principle seems logically appealing—but I wonder what the limiting principle would be?)  The other thing that caught my attention was Professor Gervais’ embrace of the view that, absent consent by both parties, only domestic courts can adjudicate questions of infringement and validity under domestic patent law.  This is, as previously noted here, the issue at the heart of the pending BMW v. Onesta dispute, in view of the CJEU’s 2025 decision in BSH v. Electrolux (which seems to me to point, whether rightly or not, in the opposite direction).   (Note that the Federal Circuit has temporarily stayed Judge Albright's antisuit injunction from last week, and we are still awaiting Judge Albright's written decision in that case.)

Wednesday, January 14, 2026

Judge Albright Enjoins Onesta from Proceeding in Munich with Claims for the Infringement of U.S. Patents

In December, I noted that, at BMW’s request, Judge Albright (W.D. Tex.) had entered a TRO prohibiting Onesta from litigating claims for the infringement of two U.S. patents in the Munich I Regional Court.  ip fray is now reporting that the judge yesterday converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction, that is, an antisuit injunction forbidding Onesta from proceeding with litigation over the U.S. patents in Munich.  I’ve checked both Pacer and Lex Machina, which show that Onesta has already filed a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit; but there is no written opinion (yet) from the judge, though I would expect some sort of written opinion might follow.

As I noted in December, the order comes after Onesta asserted claims against BMW for the infringement of both German and U.S. patents in Munich—something that the CJEU’s February 2025 decision in BSH v. Electrolux appears, on my reading, to permit it to do in a case like this, in which the defendant is domiciled in an EU member state, subject to the caveat that any decision concerning patent validity would apply only inter partes (in other words, the validity ruling would not be binding in other litigation between Onesta and another party).  BMW contested this reading in its initial motion papers, which were available from Law 360 (and on Pacer and Lex Machina).  Dennis Crouch has an excellent writeup on the issue of whether courts may adjudicate claims for the infringement of foreign patents, which notes among other things the Federal Circuit’s 2007 opinion in Voda v. Cordis (denying supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims, over a dissent from Judge Newman).  The ip fray post mentions expert declarations in the BMW case have been filed by three people I know, admire, and have worked with, namely Professors Peter Picht (in support of Onesta), Margo Bagley (in support of BMW), and Matthias Leistner (also in support of BMW).  Their declarations, attached to the motion papers, are available here, here, and here.  (I have not yet read through all of them carefully myself.)

For my February 2025 writeup on BSH, see here.  Also note that, in my December post, I flagged as a possible issue (to which I do not claim to know the answer) whether the German court, if it were to adjudicate claims for the infringement of U.S. patents, would apply German or U.S. law to the question of remedies, especially permanent injunctive relief.  That would be a huge issue here, where under U.S. law an injunction in a  case like this would be difficult to obtain.

Wednesday, December 17, 2025

Judge Albright Issues Antisuit TRO Relating to Assertion in Munich of Claims for the Infringement of U.S. Patents

This dispute is reported this morning on Law360 and on ip fray.  When BSH v Electrolux came out earlier this year (see my blog post here, a more recent one noting an article about the case here, and a third I hadn't previously noted here), I predicted that before long it would cause a stir in the U.S.  Well, here we are.  It was reported recently that Onesta, an NPE, had asserted claims in the Munich I Regional Court against BMW for, inter alia, the infringement of two U.S. patents.  U.S. District Judge Albright has now issued a TRO ordering Onesta to refrain from making “any request, claim, application, or motion further pursuing or enforcing an injunction from a foreign court—including but not limited to the Munich Regional Court I—which would prohibit, deter, impose monetary fines on, or otherwise limit in any way BMW’s, and all of its corporate parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates, ability to fully and completely prosecute this action, request and enforce relief, or which would impair this Court’s ability to adjudicate any and all matters in this lawsuit”; and from making “any request, claim, application, or motion further pursuing or enforcing an injunction from a foreign court—including but not limited to the Munich Regional Court I—which would prohibit or otherwise limit in any way BMW’s, and all of its corporate parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates, ability to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States any vehicle, product, or other item on the basis of Onesta’s United States patent.”  The TRO was granted ex parte, so there will be a further hearing.  The Law 360 article includes BMW’s complaint and motion(see pp. 13-14).

One very important issue lurking in the background, in cases like this and in the event that other litigants invoke BSH v. Electrolux in an effort to litigate claims for the infringement of U.S. patents in European courts, is whether those courts will apply U.S. or their own domestic law with regard to remedies, especially injunctive relief (which is much more limited in the U.S.--here's a decision rendered today, for example, by the Federal Circuit, which I will have to blog about at some point after I finish exam grading).  Another is whether an EU court might, at least in some cases, voluntarily stay litigation involving foreign patents so that claims involving those patents could be litigated on their home turf.  To my knowledge, civil law jurisdictions do not recognize, as a general matter, recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens; but the BSH decision itself suggests the possibilities of at least stays pending invalidity determinations, and perhaps domestic law would allow stays more generally where there is parallel litigation in another country.  (I'd appreciate any information others may have on this issue.)  A third is whether paragraph 61 of BSH (which states that "It follows that, under the general rule laid down in Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled have, in principle, jurisdiction in an infringement action brought against that defendant by the holder of a patent granted or validated in a third State which is domiciled in another Member State") authorizes a plaintiff such as Onesta, which if I understand correctly is domiciled in the U.S. (or is the German action being filed by a German subsidiary?  I don't think so, but if any readers know better, please correct me), to assert a claim in an EU member state against a defendant domiciled in a member state, for the infringement of a U.S. patent.  In other words, does the Brussels Regulation (Recast) apply in such a case, regardless of where the plaintiff is domiciled?  My understanding is that it does, but I would appreciate any insights from someone who is more knowledgeable than I about that very specific issue.