As I explain in my book (see in particular pp.
110-14, 187-89, 264-65, 314-17), courts throughout the world disagree on
whether the patentee is entitled to recover lost profits in a case in which the
infringer could have made the same number of sales simply by resorting to the
use of an available noninfringing alternative. In some countries,
including the U.S. and France, the existence of a noninfringing alternative in
such a case eliminates the patentee's ability to recover lost profits. In
other countries, most notably the U.K., noninfringing alternatives are
irrelevant; the leading case there is an old one, United Horse-Shoe &
Nail Co. v. John Stewart & Co. (1888) L.R. 13 App. Case 401 (H.L.), but
courts in the U.K. have continued to cite it with approval. As for
Canada, the Supreme Court held in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser,
2004 SCC 34, that noninfringing alternatives are relevant to the
calculation of the defendant's profits (see my book pp. 191, 203-05). The
question remained, however, whether Canadian courts would apply that same rule
to a case involving the plaintiff's lost profits, or whether they would follow United
Horse-Shoe.
Professor Siebrasse has now brought to my
attention a Canadian decision, Merck & Co. v. Apotex, Inc. (Fed.
Ct. July 16, 2013), that was released to the public this past Monday and that
addresses this issue head-on. As Justice Snider explains in her opinion,
the patent in suit (which has now expired) was a "product-by-process
patent for the anti-cholesterol drug, lovastatin, when made with a
micro-organism known as Aspergillus terreus." In an earlier
proceeding, the court concluded that the patent was valid and infringed.
The principal issue in the damages trial was whether Merck was entitled to
recover its lost profits or only a reasonable royalty, given that Apotex's
suppliers could have made lovastatin "using a non-infringing process
(referred to as AFI-4), a process which uses the micro‑organism Coniothyrium fuckelii
rather than Aspergillus terreus." (Indeed, some lovastatin was
made for Apotex using the noninfringing process.) In a lengthy opinion,
Justice Snider squarely rejects "Apotex’s argument that its non-infringing
alternative should be taken into account in assessing damages," and awards
Merck Canada and Merck USA a grand total of $Can 119,054,327, plus pre- and
post-judgment interest (which I think makes this one of the biggest damages judgment
ever in Canada, though I could be mistaken). In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Snider distinguishes Schmeiser on the ground that an accounting
of defendant's profits is fundamentally different from an award of plaintiff's
lost profits, in that the former is an equitable remedy whereas damages are
available as a matter of right (para. 45). She also notes the U.K.'s
adherence to United Horse-Shoe and the citation of that case with
approval in some Canadian case law, including one of her own previous
decisions. On a policy basis, Justice Snider concludes that accepting
noninfringing alternatives as relevant "would result in an inadequate
compensation for injured plaintiffs and the infringer escaping responsibility
for its infringement" (para. 113), and states that she "could not
agree more" with the following passages from Merck's final written
argument (paras. 119-20):
Where a patentee like Merck does not typically license
its invention, a would-be infringer with a less efficient non-infringing
alternative would simply proceed to infringe the patent with full knowledge
that, at the end of the day, the infringer will only have to pay a reasonable
royalty for its unauthorized use of the patent. Adopting such a rule
amounts to a judicial sanction on infringers like Apotex taking for itself a
compulsory license and is flatly inconsistent with Canada’s public reasons for
repealing compulsory licensing, and inconsistent with Canada’s international
obligations.
Thus, if adopted, the NIA defence would render
illusory the grant of the monopoly that this court has already found to be
valid and infringed. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the
intent of the Patent
Act.
Far from protecting valid and infringed patents,
Apotex’s assertion, if accepted, would actually create an incentive to infringe.
Apotex’s position in this litigation is that it should only have to pay (at
most) the cost savings associated with using the infringing AFI-1 process.
If this position is accepted, a competitor will always choose to infringe
rather than use the more expensive and less efficient non-infringing
alternative.
My own view, as expressed repeatedly in my book,
is that United Horse-Shoe and its progeny are fundamentally wrong as a
matter of economic logic. If, but for the infringement, the defendant
would have resorted to a noninfringing alternative that would have enabled it
to make all the sales it made using an infringing product, the patentee quite
literally has suffered no lost profit attributable to the infringement.
Put another way, the patentee's profit on sales of its patented products in the
hypothetical world of no-infringement would have been no different than its
profit on actual sales in the real world of infringement. Awarding the
patentee lost profits premised on its having captured all of the defendant's
infringing sales thus results in overcompensation. The correct remedy to
restore the patentee to the position it would have occupied but-for the infringement
is a reasonable royalty calculated on the basis of what the parties would have
agreed to in arms-length negotiations prior to the infringement (e.g., some
portion of the defendant's expected cost savings from using the infringing
process as opposed to the next-best available noninfringing alternative).
In response to the argument that this rule "create[s] an incentive
infringe," I would note that the infringing defendant is worse off than
the noninfringing defendant to the extent that it incurs attorneys' fees--both
its own and, in Canada and in most countries other than the U.S., some portion
of the prevailing patentee's fees as well--and is potentially subject (in
Canada) to punitive damages or (in the U.S.) to treble damages or (in yet other
countries) to some form of enhancement to compensate for risks that the
licensor bears and that the infringer forgoes.
Anyway, whether you agree with Justice Snider or
with me, her opinion is a good read. Personally, though, I hope that the
Federal Court of Appeal or the Canadian Supreme Court will see fit to lay United
Horse-Shoe to rest, once and for all, in my neighbor to the north.
Update: Professor Siebrasse informs me that, as large as the judgment is in the above case, it's not the largest in Canadian history. The biggest is the $215 million judgment awarded to generic drug maker Apotex for having been kept out of the market by Sanofi-Aventis. See Professor Siebrasse's write-up, here.
Update: Professor Siebrasse informs me that, as large as the judgment is in the above case, it's not the largest in Canadian history. The biggest is the $215 million judgment awarded to generic drug maker Apotex for having been kept out of the market by Sanofi-Aventis. See Professor Siebrasse's write-up, here.
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