1. Enrico Bonadio and Luke McDonagh published a post on the Kluwer Patent Blog titled Patenting Standards and Declarations of Essentiality in Europe: The Report of the “Pilot Project”. The post discusses the Pilot Program for Essentiality Assessment of Standard Essential Patents (coauthored by Rudi Bekkers, Joachim Henkel, Elena Mas Tur, Tommy Van Der Vorst, Menno Driesse, Byeongwoo Kang, Arianna Martinelli, Wim Maas, Bram Nijhof, Emilio Raiteri, Lisa Teubner, and Nikolaus Thumm), produced in response to a call for tenders by the European Commission.
2. Bowman Heiden posted a paper on ssrn titled IPR Policy As Strategy – The Battle To Define the Meaning of Frand, Here is a link to the paper, and here is the abstract:
The current contentions over SEP licensing in mobile telecommunications is primarily a result of the success of standardization to build a multi-trillion-dollar market. This success has generated a large economic surplus, whose distribution among different actors in the value chain is the focus of these contentions. This article illustrates the battle among market actors to define the meaning of FRAND through policy interventions that seek to change the rules of the game in alignment with their strategic interests. This article takes a first step towards building an operative model to describe the political processes behind the construction of the meaning of FRAND by defining the self-assertive interests, key normative concepts and claims, and legitimizing arenas where the concept of FRAND is actively socially constructed.
3. Florian Mueller posted a podcast on developments in component-level licensing, featuring Christian Donle, Jay Jurata, Paul Lugard, and Pat Treacy.
4. Nikhil Purohit published a post on SpicyIP titled SEPs and Confidentiality Clubs: Protecting Fair Play from Excessive Secrecy, discussing a decision of the Delhi High Court rejected a two-tiered confidentiality club proposal tendered by InterDigital in its FRAND lawsuit against Xiaomi.
5. Chayanin Wipusanawan has posted a paper on ssrn titled Standard-essential patents and incentives for innovation. Here is a link to the paper, and here is the abstract:
Patent holders whose patents are essential to a standard are usually required to license their patents under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. This requirement is often interpreted as a price cap such that royalties for the patents do not exceed their pre-standardisation incremental values. Using a theoretical model of innovators with interacting technologies, I consider the problem of choosing the incentive scheme to induce welfare-maximising research investments under the condition that it only uses the values created by the innovators, and analyse the prevalent interpretation of FRAND compared to the optimal scheme. It shows that in some cases, this incremental value rule does not lead to the efficient level of innovation investment.