1. Last year I published several posts on IWNComm v. Sony, in which the Beijing IP Court issued an injunction for the infringement of a FRAND-committed standard essential patent (see here, here, here, here, here, here, and here). and China’s first injunction in standard essential patent litigation, 12 JIPLP 717 (2017). Here is a link to the paper, and here is the abstract:
Xian Xidian Jietong Wireless Communication Co., Ltd (IWNComm) v SONY mobile communication products (China) Co. Ltd., Beijing Intellectual Property Court, 22 March 2017
The first injunction in a Chinese case concerning standard essential patents was recently granted by the Beijing Intellectual Property Court to a Chinese company that owns a standard essential patent for WLAN access.
Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd & Ors, High Court of England and Wales,  EWHC 711 (Pat), 5 April 2017
The UK Patents Court has decided that the commitment made by a holder of standards essential patents (SEPs) to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms is enforceable separately from any obligation to license based on competition law and that there can be only one set of FRAND licence terms in a given set of circumstances.In addition, Pat Treacy and Matthew Hunt have published, simul;taneously in the January 2018 issue of GRUR Int. (pp. 91-96) and in 13 JIPLP 124-31 a paper titled Litigating a 'FRAND' Patent Licence: The Unwired Planet v. Huawei Judgment. Here is a link, and here is the abstract:
- Companies holding standard essential patents (SEPs) are required to license those patents at a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) rate.
- The judgment of the High Court of England and Wales in Unwired Planet v Huawei is very significant: it is the first time an English court has determined a FRAND royalty rate.
- This article unpacks the key findings of the judgment: (i) the enforceability of FRAND, (ii) the ability of a court to declare that terms are FRAND, (iii) the existence of only one set of FRAND terms in any given circumstances, (iv) the FRAND obligations placed on SEP holders and implementers, (v) the principle that not all offers made need to be FRAND, (vi) how a FRAND rate can be calculated, (vii) ‘hard-edged’ non-discrimination, (viii) the geographic scope of a FRAND licence, (ix) the availability of injunctive relief and damages and (x) whether an abuse of dominance has been committed.