1. Joseph A. Alfred has published a paper titled Licensing Standards Essential Patents in les Nouvelles, Sept. 2017, pp. 223-28. Here is a link to the paper, and here is the abstract:
This article reviews the progress of cellular standards and compares that rise with the increase of standards essential patents because of the smartphone. Relevant case law is examined including the seminal Georgia-Pacific fifteen factors and how they were cited in 95 cases since 1995. Relevant articles are reviewed concerning the smartphone royalty stack, GATT and standards and in particular the case law surrounding device licensing represented by the key factors deciding the Microsoft v. Motorola case. A way forward is proposed that industry once again take the lead to determine reasonable royalty when licensing standards essential patents.
2. Roberto Grasso has published a paper titled Standard Essential Patents: Royalty Determination in the Supply Chain, 8 J. Euro. Comp. L. & Prac. 283 (2017). Here is a link to the paper, which lists among its "key points" the principles that royalties should be calculated based on the SSPPU and on incremental ex ante value; that for complex products, one must take into account the aggregate royalty demand; and that SEP owners "must negotiate with and provide a FRAND license to anyone who requests it, regardless of which level of the value chain it operates."
3. David Kappos published a paper in the May 2017 issue of AIPPI-Japan (pp. 111-17) titled Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking--From Theory to Data to Rethink. From the conclusion:
Scientific inquiry begins with hypotheses--it does not conclude with them. . . [W]e must accept that the latest and most robust empirical studies dispatch with the theories of patent holdup and royalty stacking, and point towards a future where patents and standard play an enduring, viral and harmonious, role.
The paper cites to papers by Galetovic, Haber, and others that I have from time to time criticized on this blog.