Begins by explaining basic concept of FRAND: promise to license on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
terms. Often required by SSOs for
standard essential patents (SEPs). “Essential”
defined by various SSO policies (IEEE, ETSI, etc.).
What happens when an SEP owner is not “reasonable”? How to define “nondiscriminatory,” “fair and
reasonable”?
Overview of expert testimony rules (Federal Rule of Evidence
702, Daubert). What is “reliable”? Relevant factors include whether the theory is
refutable, peer-reviewed, generally accepted.
Expert testimony crucial in Microsoft v. Motorola, In re
Innovatio IP Ventures LLC, and Apple v. Motorola.
Microsoft v. Motorola overview. Motorola offered 2.5% royalty rate on price
of end product. Microsoft sued for
breach of contract, alleging the offer was unreasonable. Judge Robart came up with range of reasonable
rates. Goals for royalty determinations
include promotion of widespread adoption of standards, mitigate risks of patent
holdup and royalty stacking, and induce creation of valuable standards by guaranteeing
reasonable royalties. Microsoft proposed
incremental value of technology compared to alternatives. Motorola proposed hypothetical bilateral negotiation. Court went with latter but evidence of former
relevant. Modified version of Georgia-Pacific. Court concluded that Motorola’s proposed rate
would risk royalty stacking. Method
focused on importance of patent to standard, importance of patent to accused products,
and other licenses for comparable patents.
Court determined significantly lower rate than Motorola proposed.
Innovatio was an infringement case where damages were tried
first. Innovatio bound by prior patent
owners’ RAND commitment. Court applied “top
down” approach: average profit per WiFi
chip as maximum royalty base, multiply by number of asserted SEPs and divide by
total number of all patent owners’ SEPs, adjust denominator to reflect relative
value of Innovatio’s SEPs to WiFi standard.
Judge believed this would be nondiscriminatory and avoid stacking,
apportion value to patents without relying on information about other licenses
that may not be available. End result
much lower than what Innovatio sought.
Heyman asks: how does
this apply to expert reports? Focus on importance
of SEP to standard: total number of SEPs
and SEP holders, level of involvement in standards process, and value of SEP to
standard (efficiency gains, improvements over past methods and alternative
methods, whether it was an optional or core feature). Show importance of specific patented feature,
not entire standard, to the product. How
many SEPs actually used, core/minor features.
Independent analysis showing patents do in fact cover the products
through claim charts, not unsubstantiated expert testimony.
As for comparable licenses, licenses taken as part of
settlement not relevant in Microsoft.
Portfolios including unrelated patents:
maybe persuasive if can apportion relative value of each patent to
license. Licenses not negotiated under
RAND obligations not persuasive.
Comparable prior licenses:
patent pooling. Good indicator if
comparable and adjusted. Focus on timing
of formation of pool, number and diversity of participants, participation in
pool by licensor, and success of the standard.
Adjustment factors: pool rates
tend to be lower, may allocate royalties based on quantity not quality, must
account for value of membership in pool aside from royalties.
Another methodology employed in Ericsson v. D-Link? Jury award, so harder to analyze.
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