As
I discuss in my book (pp. 245-48), to date German courts almost always award
the prevailing patent owner a permanent injunction, unless the defendant
successfully raises the competition law (Orange-Book-Standard)
defense (which is rare). According to
the Orange-Book-Standard decision, TFEU
article 102 prevents a patent owner who occupies a dominant position in a
relevant market from obtaining an injunction, if the following two conditions
are met: (1) The infringer proves that it “made an offer,
ready for acceptance, on contractual conditions, which the patent holder cannot
refuse without thereby treating the party seeking a license unequally without
good cause as compared with similar enterprises or impeding him inequitably”;
and (2) it “behaves as if the patent holder
had already accepted his offer” by paying “the consideration that the licensee
would be obliged to pay according to a non-discriminatory or non-obstructive
licence contract.” BGH May 6, 2009, GRUR
Int. 747, 2009 (Ger.), English
translation available at 41 IIC 369-75 (2010). In practice, however, it has proven extremely
difficult to meet these conditions. In
addition, German courts have held that for the defense to apply, the potential
licensee also must agree not to challenge the patent’s validity. See, e.g., OLG Karlsruhe, Jan. 23, 2012, 6 U
136/11, Mitt. Heft 3/2012, 137. Of course, it is possible that the Orange-Book-Standard framework will be
modified in the near future. The
European Commission has issued Statements of Objections against both Motorola
and Samsung, based on these firms’ requests for injunctive relief despite
having committed to license their SEPs on FRAND terms, in possible violation of
E.U. competition law. See European Commission, Press Release,
Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of
Objections to Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone
Standard-Essential Patents (May 6, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-406_en.htm; European Commission, Press Release,
Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of
Objections to Samsung on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential
Patents (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_en.htm. And in March 2013, a German court referred
to the Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU) the question of whether
it is an abuse of dominant position, in violation of E.U. competition law, for
the owner of an SEP who has made a FRAND commitment to seek an injunction when
the infringer has expressed its willingness to negotiate a FRAND license. See LG
Düsseldorf, March 21, 2013, Case No. 4 b O 104/12, GRUR-RR 196, 2013. But for now, at least, the conditions under
which German courts will deny permanent injunctions are pretty narrow.
During
my visit to Munich last month, however, my friend Dr, Heinz Goddar alerted to me an
old law review article by Dr. Heinrich Tetzner, Patentschutz wesentlicher Grundstücksbestandteile, in Deutsches
Gemein- und Wirtschaftsrecht vom 1. und 15. Februar 1942, 3/4, at pp.
44-45. The title translates to something
like Patent Protection of Essential
Property Components. Tetzner adapted
and expanded the relevant portion in his 1972 book Das Materielle Patentrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, at pp. 87-88. Tetzner’s subject is whether patent rights
can subsist in articles that are incorporated into real property. In
relevant part, Teztner writes (this is my translation, from his 1972 book, so apologies if it's a bit rough):
The approach to the foregoing question must start from the common principle, that the exercise of subjective rights are constrained by the protectable interests of society, that any exercise which infringes upon the common good is a misuse. Moreover, the assertion of a claim arising from patent law may not succeed, if it will result in a disproportionate destruction of business value, if the tearing apart of a thing into components, which the exercise of exclusive patent rights always threatens to imply, either reduces the value of a portion disproportionately or gives rise to costs which are out of proportion to the value of the part. . . .. . . This patent protection is not lost through its installation in an unmovable asset; but it is, according to common principles, possible that the assertion of a patent claim is constrained. The patent owner cannot proceed without consideration for the damage accruing to the infringer, and there must be a comparison of interests, whereby all the circumstances of the case are considered, as well as the degree of fault on the part of the infringer in relation to the person who stands to be injured by the removal of the portion.
The
article is also cited with approval in the Benkard patent
treatise. See Benkard Patentgesetz, 10th edition, page 1401, number 26a,
last sentence of first paragraph. The
basic idea reminds me of such pre-eBay cases
in the U.S. as City of Milwaukee v.
Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934), in which the
court decided not to enter an injunction the immediate consequence of which would
have been the discharge of raw sewage into Lake Michigan.
If German courts were to apply this principle in standard essential patent cases, would they conclude that (at least sometimes) an injunction should not issue because it would lead to a disproportionate burden on the defendant? On the one hand, if the maker of a device infringes an SEP and is enjoined, consumers who already are in possession of the infringing devices are not likely to be required to stop using them. And the device is a mass-market product, unlike, say, a building. But the harm suffered as a result of the injunction can be greatly disproportionate to the ex ante value of the patent, and an appropriate balancing of interests may well lead one to conclude that no injunction should issue (without having to invoke competition law).
If German courts were to apply this principle in standard essential patent cases, would they conclude that (at least sometimes) an injunction should not issue because it would lead to a disproportionate burden on the defendant? On the one hand, if the maker of a device infringes an SEP and is enjoined, consumers who already are in possession of the infringing devices are not likely to be required to stop using them. And the device is a mass-market product, unlike, say, a building. But the harm suffered as a result of the injunction can be greatly disproportionate to the ex ante value of the patent, and an appropriate balancing of interests may well lead one to conclude that no injunction should issue (without having to invoke competition law).
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