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Thursday, November 19, 2026

Dhenne on A Contractual Theory of FRAND

I mentioned earlier this week that Matthieu Dhenne, a frequent contributor to the Kluwer Patent Blog, has published a new book titled A Contractual Theory of FRAND:  From Private Normativity to Legal Obligation in Technical Standardization (Wolters Kluwer 2026).  I recently finished reading it, and I think it makes an important contribution to the literature.  The book begins, and continues throughout, to employ the author’s framework of distinguishing three layers relevant to addressing FRAND questions:  the technical standard, the SSO IPR policy, and the individual FRAND undertaking.  The technical standard itself creates an “infrastructural dependence” that enables holdup, to which the SSO IPR policy, which may require the FRAND undertaking, is a response; and the nature of that undertaking, in the case of the ETSI IPR policy, is “a French-law unilateral juridical act intended to produce legal effects” (p.4).  Put another way, the FRAND undertaking “may be described as a juridical counterweight to” the “leverage created by technical by technical indispensability” (p.20), “an infrastructure-based constraint to principles of legal justification, thereby aligning technical necessity with normative legitimacy” (p.69; see also p.75).  More specifically, the FRAND commitment SEP owners make to ETSI creates, as the English courts have recognized, a stipulation pour autrui under French law—effectively, a third-party beneficiary contract, to use common-law terminology—even though the identity of the beneficiaries and the specific content of the FRAND license remain to be determined.  From these propositions, Dr. Dhenne concludes that recognizing the FRAND undertaking as contractual in nature is logically prior to such other issues as the availability of injunctive relief, the appropriate royalty rate, and so on; that “the willing-licensee inquiry belongs within the law of performance, good faith, and remedies rather than serving as a complete theory of FRAND” (p.8); that both competition law and patent law should play only a subordinate role in resolving FRAND disputes (see, e.g., pp. 89, 120); and that, “[o]nce a SEP holder has undertaken to license on FRAND terms, an injunction can no longer be treated as automatically available on the same terms as in ordinary patent litigation,” because “the FRAND undertaking conditions its exercise by reference to the undertaking and to the parties’ conduct in performing it” (p.116).  To be sure, there are many complexities that a court would need to take into account in crafting the terms of a FRAND license—it’s not just a matter of determining the appropriate rate and base, but other terms and conditions as well—but the author argues that there is nothing unusual about judges having to ascertain the nature of the obligation owing to the third party beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui, even if (like the FRAND undertaking) it is not reducible to “a single mathematically acceptable endpoint”  (pp. 101-07).  The author does not necessarily endorse the English and Chinese practice of establishing global FRAND terms without consent of both parties, however, stating toward the end that “French law governing the ETSI undertaking does not by itself give every court authority to determine a global licence, issue anti-suit relief, or compel arbitration,” because “[j]urisdiction, procedural power, and recognition remain governed by the relevant rules of private international and procedural law” (p.124).  He closes with some suggestions for best practices (p.125). 

 A Contractual Theory of FRAND: From Private Normativity to Legal Obligation in Technical Standardization

As I stated above, I think this is an important contribution to the literature on FRAND, and I find the emphasis on the ETSI undertaking as a contractual response to restrain technical indispensability as a useful way to approach the matter.  Under this approach, both owners and implementers have corresponding rights and responsibilities under French law, the fulfillment of which should lead either to voluntary agreement or, if needed, judicial determination.  Shifting the terms of the debate away, to some extent, from competition law and patent law may well be the right perspective; and though there will remain differences among jurisdictions concerning how to determine the appropriate FRAND terms and conditions, the author holds out hope for “convergence around practical guidance shared by courts and standard setters,” similar to what Lord Justice Arnold and  Francisco Hernández Fernández have recommended, as this blog has previously noted here and here.  

Monday, November 16, 2026

2026 IPHC-MOIP International Conference

Many thanks to Professor Jorge Contreras for passing along a link to the website of the 2026 IPHC-MOIP International Conference, hosted by the Intellectual Property High Court of Korea and the Ministry of Intellectual Property of Korea, and organized by the Korea Intellectual Property Protection Agency.  The conference was held in Seoul on November 4-5.   (These were the same days I was in Macau and Hong Kong; I may post something about that conference in the days to come.)    The Seoul conference, titled “Global IP:  New Horizons in Adjudication and Policy,” covered several topics, among them “SEP/FRAND and Global Litigation.”  That particular session was moderated by the Hon. Jiyoung Li of the Intellectual Property High Court of Korea and included as speakers Hon. Richard Arnold,  Hon. Yiting Dai (Supreme People’s Court, China), Hon. Fabian Hoffmann (Federal Supreme Court, Germany), Hiroaki Imai (Intellectual Property High Court, Japan), Hon. Kisu Kim (Intellectual Property High Court, Korea), Hon. Matthias Zigann (UPC), and Professor Contreras.  Quite an impressive lineup!  Conference materials, including slides by the preceding speakers, are available on the website.   

While on the topic of FRAND, I should also note that Dr. Matthieu Dhenne, a frequent contributor to the Kluwer Patent Blog, has published an excellent new book titled A Contractual Theory of FRAND: From Private Normativity to Legal Obligation in Technical Standardization (Wolters Kluwer 2026).  I recently finished reading it, and plan to say a few words about it by the end of the week. 

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

RIP Richard A. Posner

I just saw the news that Richard Posner has died.  He was a giant among legal scholars--indeed, one of the most heavily cited legal scholars of all time.  Speaking from my own perspective, I would estimate that the vast majority of the books and articles on IP and antitrust that I've published over the years contain at least one Posner cite, and more likely several if we include both his scholarship and his judicial opinions; and his work on legal pragmatism in the 1990s has long influenced the way I approach legal and policy issues.  One of the things I most appreciated about him was how his thought evolved over time:  from Brennan clerk in the early 1960s, to Chicago School classical liberal to, later in his career, something of a centrist, perhaps even a liberal of sorts in the contemporary sense of the term.  He was intellectually honest, and so he went in whatever direction he thought the evidence pointed.  And whether one agreed with him on certain issues or not, I think most everyone who is familiar with his work would agree that he was a person of immense intellectual curiosity and tremendous breadth--and a memorable writer to boot. 

 

About ten years ago, Professor Colleen Chien and I had plans to write a book with him on patent law.  Although ultimately it never came to be, it was enjoyable getting to know him a bit towards the end of his career.  As I recall, we even talked about cats at one point.  He loved cats.

 

Rest in peace, Judge Posner.  You were a true original, the likes of which we may never see again.


 Headshot photo of Judge Posner

 

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

UPC Munich Local Division on Damages for Convoyed and Springboard Sales

The decision is Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Meril GmbH, UPC_CFI_1160/2026 (Oct. 28, 2026).  I blogged about an earlier order in this matter here.  Prior to that, in an earlier proceeding, Meril was found to have infringed Edwards’ patent (EP 3 699 828 B2) for a prosthetic heart valve.  Edwards thereafter “filed an application for the determination of damages, which includes a request for an order to lay open books” (para. 2).  Specifically, Edwards claims that it is entitled to discovery pertaining to damages not only for the infringing products themselves, but also for (1) “related accessory products” (“convoyed goods”); and (2) damages relating to other noninfringing products which, according to Edwards, Meril would not have sold but for the foothold that the infringing products provided (referred to here as “springboard damages”).  From the decision:

4. Edwards argues that as a result of the infringement of EP 828, Meril has also sold related accessory products, including the Navigator delivery apparatuses, crimping devices, delivery sheaths, and balloon catheters. Such accessory products constitute “convoyed” goods, namely products that would not have been sold but for the underlying infringement. Further, as a result of the infringement of EP 828, Meril has established (a) relationships with clinicians responsible for the implantation of THV devices; (b) a distribution network for THV devices; (c) a clinical evidence base which it uses to market the “Myval Series”, including devices other than the Infringing Products, i.e., the Octacor THV / System, Octapro THV / System, and Octapro+ THV / System (together, the “Other Relevant Devices”; and (d) other relationships and knowledge regarding the THV market within the Territory for Relief. Edwards understands that the CE marks granted in respect of the “Other Relevant Devices” have been granted on the basis that no “significant changes” have been made to their design and intended purpose as compared to the “legacy device”, being the Myval System (per Medical Device Regulation 2017/745, Art. 120.324). As a consequence, these devices have essentially been able to “ride on the back” of the approval given for the Myval System, a device which infringes EP 828. Consequently, but for the infringement of EP 828, Meril would not have been able to obtain approval for these other devices in Europe or at least would not have been able to avoid undergoing a full MDR certification process –i.e., submitting an MDR application, undergoing assessment of the technical documentation demonstrating conformity with MDR requirements and obtaining approval of the MDR evaluation package - which would have delayed approval by several years. Edwards also understands that Meril has “substituted” one THV device for another in the context of national approvals, tenders, etcetera where a particular THV device has ceased to be available due to the grant of an injunction. As a result, Meril has been able to use an infringing device to establish a foothold in the market, and then substitute a different device when that device ceased to be available as a result of activities which have been found by a court to infringe Edwards’ patent rights. . . .

 

26. . . . as any order pursuant to Rule 141RoP must be proportionate, the possibility of ordering access to information is limited, particularly with regard to information relating to non-infringing activities.

 

27. The need to take the principle of proportionality (and fairness/equity) into account follows from Art. 42 UPCA, the Preamble to the RoP (2-6) and Art. 10.3 and Art. 13.1 of the Enforcement Directive. The latter demands that damages awarded to the patent owner are proportionate to the actual prejudice suffered as a result of the infringement. By virtue of Art. 20 UPCA, the Unified Patent Court shall apply Union law in its entirety and respect its primacy.

 

28. One aspect of proportionality is necessity. . . .

 

34. The extent to which the profits realised are attributable to the infringement of the intellectual property right cannot usually be determined precisely but only estimated. The necessary causal link between the infringement of the intellectual property right and the profit realised must not be understood solely in terms of adequate causality. Even in the case of profits derived from the marketing of devices manufactured in accordance with a patent, it must rather be determined, on a discretionary basis, whether and to what extent the profit realised is reasonably attributable to the characteristics of the sold item associated with the infringed intellectual property right or to other factors. Profits that are causally related but too far removed should not be attributed as having no sufficient connection with the infringement.

 

35. On this basis, the claim for the surrender of the infringer’s profits also encompasses ancillary transactions which, whilst not constituting an act of use within the meaning of Art. 25, 26 UPCA, are nevertheless concluded in a causal connection with acts of infringement and have a sufficient link to the infringing subject-matter.

 

36. Such a sufficient connection exists, in any event, in the case of profits from transactions involving consumables or reusable devices intended for use with a patent-infringing device. However, this only applies when those transactions are causally linked to the patent infringement. As with the profit derived from placing the infringing article on the market, the profit derived from the sale of consumables in such scenarios will, as a rule, not be based solely on the infringement, but on other factors that were decisive for the customer’s purchasing decision. However, this does not alter the fact that the profit is in any event also based on the patent infringement, because the distribution of consumables or any other related accessory devices, respectively, would not have been possible, or not to the same extent, without the placing on the market of the patent-infringing device. This is particularly evident in situations where the consumable or any other related accessory devices, respectively, is, by its very nature, tailored to the protected device, or where sourcing from a single supplier offers advantages for other reasons. A defining feature of the distribution of consumables or any other related accessory devices, respectively, is precisely the close link to the infringing business, which quite naturally paves the way for further revenue from the supply of consumables or any other related accessory devices, respectively, as these are necessary to put the infringing product into proper operation or to continue using it. This almost inevitable connection necessitates the extension of liability for damages to include such subsequent transactions as well.

 

37. Therefore, when calculating the damage caused by a patent-infringing offer, also profits derived from the performance of a contract causally linked to that offer must not be disregarded merely because the acts carried out in performance of the contract were carried out with non-infringing devices. . . .

 

42. Meril did not object to (information regarding) profits made from the sale of 'related accessory devices' being considered alongside those from infringing devices. This is because devices such as the crimping device are tailored to the properties of the infringing Myval THV device and designed to be used together. . . .

 

43. It cannot be ruled out at this point that profits earned with 'other relevant devices' and related accessory devices' along with them are to be taken into account if Meril participated in a tender offering at least one infringing device. This applies, as explained above, even if the tender offer has been amended subsequently and the infringing device was replaced with a non-infringing 'other relevant device'. This is because the infringing activity is participating in the tender with an infringing device. Participation in a tender constitutes an offer in the sense of Art. 25(a) UPCA and therefore constitutes an infringing activity. Even if the infringing device is replaced with a non-infringing device later on, any profits earned thereafter are causally linked to the infringing offer that secured the tender. Therefore, these profits might be considered as unfair as these profits would not otherwise have been possible. They are also directly linked to the patented invention, since the invention was incorporated into the device used to win the tender. Profits from 'related accessory devices' might also be attributed to the participation in this tender, even if the sales were made after the infringing product was replaced by a non-infringing one.

 

44. Profits made by Meril from sales of 'other relevant devices' and 'related accessory devices' outside of this scenario and/or without any close connection to infringing activities, are clearly not to be considered.

 

45. Edwards is arguing that Meril used the infringing devices to enrol patients in the LANDMARK and COMPARE clinic trials, build a distribution network and establish and deepen relationships with interventional cardiologists. Thus, according to Edwards, Meril used the infringing products as a springboard to launch the “other relevant devices” thereby securing an unlawful start in their development, validation, customer adoption and market positioning. Edwards argues e.g. that the CE marks granted in respect of the “other relevant devices” have been granted on the basis that no signification changes to the infringing Myval THV are present.

 

46. This is not convincing. The sales of the non-infringing 'other relevant devices', as outlined by Edwards, do not have sufficient (causal) connection with the infringing acts and are not sufficiently linked to the infringing subject matter, unlike sales of non-infringing devices following an offer of an infringing device. Edwards has not established that these activities, particularly the use of infringing devices in clinical trials or in the administrative process for acquiring CE marks, constitute a use under Article 25 and 26 of the UPCA or the relevant national law in the protected territories. Even if that were the case, subsequent sales of non-infringing products would no longer be sufficiently linked to the use of the invention. The invention relates to the folding of tabs 112, 116 within a leaflet structure within an implantable prosthetic heart valve . . . . Non-infringing devices use a different leaflet structure. The benefits described by Edwards, such as the distribution network and relationships with cardiologists, must be considered as independent of this limited contribution to the state of the art provided by the invention protected by the patent in suit. None of these benefits have been achieved because of the specific leaflet properties.

The court also notes that "[f]or periods prior to the coming into force of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, the calculation of damages must be based on the national law of the relevant member states in which the infringing activities took place" (para. 39), but concludes that no other result is mandated under German or French law (paras. 60-66).

Overall, this seems like a pretty reasonable approach to me.  The court’s position on convoyed goods appears to be slightly more favorable to the patentee than the corresponding rule in the United States.  As I explained in my August post,  under Rite-Hite Co. v. Kelley Corp., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), although infringers can be liable for lost profits on sales of noninfringing goods that compete with infringing products, they are not liable for lost profits on sales of noninfringing complementary products that the patent owner ordinarily sells along with the patented article, unless those complementary products “function together with the patented component in some manner so as to produce a desired end product or result” and are therefore “analogous to components of a single assembly or be parts of a complete machine, or . . . constitute a functional unit.”  The U.S. rule can be defended on various grounds, but I am inclined to think it is too formalistic and that normal proximate causation principles should apply.  Applying those principles to a case like Meril arguably would result in an outcome similar to that which the LD Munich reached, which may result in recovery for damages on convoyed goods (para. 36) but not for the more remotely-caused benefits or harms based on the development of customer relationships and such.    

Edwards and/or Meril may appeal, and the extent of any damages eventually to be awarded remains to be seen.  

For discussion elsewhere, see the write-ups on ip fray, EPLaw, and Kluwer.